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ABSTRACT 
 
THE CYPRUS QUESTION; LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND SCENARIOS  
 
 MEHMET BALCI 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Hasan Ünal  
September  2004 
 
 
 
This thesis evaluates the latest developments on the island while focusing on the 
reasons of why a solution has not been founded on the island up to now. For the 
Greek Cypriot Side the objective is, including the whole territory of the island, to 
establish a sovereign Hellenic Republic in which the Turkish Cypriots are in 
minority status. In order to achieve this objective, they have pursued different 
strategies through different period of times and tried to use the EU and the UN 
through their own benefits. As a consequence of this strategy, the Turkish Cypriot 
side had been seen as an reluctant side in reaching an agreement in international area  
until the time at which the Annan Plan was put into referendum. In fact, the objective 
of Turkish side is no more than to come to an agreement  providing  the equal status 
that the 1960 treaties envisaged. The Annan Plan is far away from providing this 
solution, because it is an incomplete draft  similar to previous ones. The reason 
behind the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek side in the referendum is the 
belief  that they will be able to obtain more than it by  their recognized position as an 
legitimate government of Cyprus and the EU membership. Unless the international 
community accepts the equality of the Turkish Cypriots, it would be very difficult to 
reach a consensus on the island. The future of the island will depend on not only the 
manner of both sides but also the third parties.  
 
Keywords: Objectives, Negotiations, Equality, EU Membership, Annan Plan, 
Pressure, Sovereignty, Solution, Scenarios  
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ÖZET 
KIBRIS PROBLEMİ; SON GELİŞMELER VE SENARYOLAR  
 
MEHMET  BALCI 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Hasan Ünal 
Eylül 2004 
 
Bu tezde Kıbrıs’taki son gelişmeler değerlendirilerek neden şimdiye kadar her iki 
tarafın da onayladığı bir çözüme ulaşılamamasının sebepleri ele alınacaktır. Kıbrıs 
Rum tarafı için  amaç  Kıbrıs’ın tamamını içine alan  Türk azınlığa sahip bir Yunan 
devleti  olmaktır. Bu amaca ulaşmak için değişik zamanlarda farklı stratejiler 
belirlemiş, bunları uygularken Avrupa birliğini ve Birlemiş milletleri kendi çıkarları 
doğrultusunda yönlendirmeye çalışmıştır. Bunun sonucu olarak Kıbrıs Türk tarafı 
Annan Planının referanduma sunulmasına kadar uluslar arası arenada uzlaşmayan 
taraf olarak görülmüştür. Aslında Türk tarafının tek amacı 1960 antlaşmalarının 
öngördüğü eşit statüyü tekrar sağlayacak bir çözümdür. Annan Planı bu çözümü 
sağlamaktan  uzaktır çünkü  tamamlanmamış bir anlaşmadır.  Diğerleri gibi Annan 
Planı’nın Rum kesimi tarafından  kabul edilmemesinin sebebi Kıbrıs’ın resmi 
hükümeti olarak tanınmaları  ve AB’ne  üyelikleri nedeniyle kendileri için  daha bir 
anlaşma elde edebilme düşüncesidir. Kıbrıs’ta eşit bir Türk varlığı kabul edilmedikçe 
bir çözümün olması çok zordur. Gelecekte ne olacağı taraflar dışında üçüncü 
partilerin de  tutumuna bağlı olacaktır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Amaçlar, Görüşmeler, Eşitlik, Avrupa Birliğine Üyelik ,Annan 
Planı, Baskı, Egemenlik, Çözüm, Senaryolar  
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INTRODUCTION 
The conflict in Cyprus has been source of concern for the international community 
for 50 years now. Although the only period in which the incidents of violence has 
not occurred on the island is the stage begins with the 1974 Turkish Peace operation, 
the UN has tried to bring both sides together by several initiatives, but there has 
been no solution found yet. However, despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriots have 
suffered from this situation more that the other parties, in all these time period, they 
have been seen as a responsible side for the failure of the negotiations. 
In this thesis I am going to analyze the latest developments on the Cyprus problem 
with special emphasis on the Kofi Annan Plan, which has been so far the most 
recent and most recognized one by the international community. The major 
questions which I will try to answer are, why a solution has not been found on the 
island up to now? ; what will be the future of the island?; what should be done for a 
lasting settlement? 
The significance of this study is that it presents latest developments in island affair’s 
by establishing a link with  the history of Cyprus  and thus to form an idea that help 
the Cypriot Peoples to find a solution in which they will able to live peacefully in 
the future of Cyprus.    
The topic of research is of interest due to that the latest developments on the island 
have changed not only the positions of both sides, but also the third parties, 
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especially Turkey. They were also significant in terms of changing the outlooks of 
international actors on the Cyprus problem. Following the Greek Cypirot side’s 
beginning of accession negotiations with EU, the Cyprus problem became main 
obstacle to Turkey’s road through EU. The presentation of Annan Plan and the 
subsequent developments have changed the EU policy toward Turkey.  
This study argues that, unless the international community accepts the equal status 
of the TRNC it would be not be easy to reach a lasting solution on the island, since 
the Greek Cypriot side does not have an intention to reach a lasting settlement with 
their current position, and any solution can be reached only with the consent of the 
parties involving in the conflict.  
The thesis consists of four chapters. In the first chapter the recent history of Cyprus 
is analyzed in time periods. The titles of the sections are put in accordance with the 
main events occurred in that period. First, the objectives of the sides are defined in 
historical process in order to find the answer the question of what the sides want to 
get. Later, the negotiation process will be explained while touching on the major 
events that affected the negotiations. At this stage, the EU dimension is specifically 
mentioned because after 1990, the process greatly affected by the EU approach to 
the Cyprus Issue.  
In the Second Chapter, the Annan Plan is analyzed. Although there are five versions 
of the plan, the third version which was rejected in Hague European Summit of 
2003 is taken as the main text since it is much different from the first one but more 
similar to fifth one. Also the changes on the first and second versions are clarified in 
footnotes, and in order to give more definite idea about the Annan Plan, it will be 
compared with the 1960 Agreements and partly with the Set of Ideas.  
 3 
The views of the sides is the focus of third Chapter. Beside the Greek Cypirot side 
and TRNC , the third parties’ opinions will be taken in this chapter.  
In the last chapter, the events occurred in the period from the rejection of the plan by 
both parties to the referendum are evaluated. In this period the special emphasis will 
be given the New York Process and the referendum as it indeed, summarize the 
whole negotiations process on the island. Additionally, likely scenarios that might 
take place in the future are the subjects of this chapter.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  . 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: RECENT HISTORY  
1.1.  Positions Of The Parties 
1.1.1. Historical Perspective  
The roots of the Cyprus conflict dates back to the capture of the island by the 
Ottoman Empire from the Venetians in 1571. After taking control of the island, the 
Ottoman Turks treated the Greek Community as a largely self-governing religious 
group and generally assisted the Greek Cypriot population to organize themselves 
into a social and cultural entity.1 Before that, the Greek population had been 
mistreated by the Venetians and the Latin Church was predominant. 2 Under the 
Ottoman rule, the Greek Cypriot community enhanced their power, and with their 
recognized identity, lived peaceably together with the Turks more than two 
centuries.  
However the scene changed after the Greek independence war against Ottoman rule 
and first encouraged by the Greek victory in gaining independence in 1821 and than 
by the cession of the island to the Britain by the Ottoman Government in 1878, the 
Greek Cypriots’ aspiration towards  union with Greece( enosis ) increased steadily 
in the following decades.3  
                                                 
1 Gazioğlu, Ahmet C. “Cyprus During the Turkish Period (1571-1878) and Its Transition to British 
Rule.” Proceedings of the international Symposium. The Cyprus; Past, Present and the vision for the 
Future, Ed. Huseyin Gökçekuş, Lefkoşa.:Near East University,2001, pp. 17-35 
2 Newman, Fhilip. Short History of Cyprus. Nicosia, 1953, pp.171-179 
3 Dodd, C.H. “A historical overview” Cyprus: The need for new perspectives, Ed. Clement H. Dodd 
,Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999, pp.2-6 
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Subsequent annexation of island by Britain after the First World War, the Greek 
Cypriot Orthodox Church and political leaders effectively started their campaign for  
enosis by   organizing  intense violence against not only Britain’s inhabitants and 
forces  but also Turkish Cypriots through EOKA, the underground terrorist 
organization led by Greek Colonel Grivas. 4  
After  the EOKA terrorism appeared in the island, the position of Turkish Cypriots 
began to shape on the consideration of  protecting their survival. This consideration 
was supported by Turkey. Because, from the Turkey’s point of view, while Cyprus 
passed over to the English with the Lausanne agreement, a balance was established 
between Turkey and Greece, and this balance could be maintained only by the 
acceptance of the Turkish Cypriots’ existence on the island.5 
As a result of the Greek Cypriots’ efforts6, in late 1950s, Britain decided to give its 
independence to Cyprus. Consequently, in 1960, the Zurich and London 
Agreements were concluded between Turkey, Greece and Britain. The agreements 
provided independence for Cyprus on the basis of a bi-communal, co-founder 
partnership of political equals. Turkey agreed to independence for Cyprus only if 
Turkish Cypriot status as a community with equal partnership rights in government 
was assured. This assurance was very important for the Turkish Cypriots because 
when Britain decided to give its independence to the island, the Turkish Cypriots 
feared that the new situation would lead to enosis. At that time, they were seeking a 
                                                 
4 Ertegün, N.M. The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
Nicosia North: K. Rüstem, 1984, p.3 
5 Ismail, Sbahattin. “Lausanne, Atatütk and Cyprus” Proceedings of the international Symposium, 
The Cyprus; Past, Present and the vision for the Future,.Ed. Huseyin Gökçekuş, Lefkoşa. Near East 
University, 2001, p.51 
6 These efforts was strongly supported by Greece so that, in 1950’s, it carried the conflict to the 
international area by applying to UN Security Council considering the issue of self-determination 
right.  
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solution that would provide a protective shield against the  Megali İdea7 of the 
Greek Cypriot side. The London and Zurich agreements, with their arrangement 
assuring equal participation of both sides in the government and the tripartite 
guaranties of Turkey, Greece and England, seemed satisfactory for them.8On the 
other hand, since the accords would hinder the enosis, most of the Greek Cypriots 
claimed that the 1960 accords were forced upon them and the agreements denied the 
right of the Greek Cypriots as a majority. According to Greek Cypriots, the 1960 
Constitution unjustly granted a wide-range veto power to the Turkish Cypriot 
community as it represented only 18 percent of the total population.9 
After gaining independence, in order to change the balance between the two 
communities and provide the necessary conditions for enosis, the ‘Akritas Plan’10 
was drawn up in 1963 by the Greek Cypriot leadership in collusion with Greece, and 
following that  the President Archbishop Makarios suggested certain amendments in 
the Constitution to limit the rights that had been given to the Turkish community by 
the London and Zurich Treaties. Turkish Cypriots refused to accept  amendments  
since it would have almost left the Turkish Cypriots with no more than minority 
rights. They fought against the Greek troops that forced them to comply with the 
Greek Cypriots’ demands for the constitutional changes. As a result of these attacks, 
Turkish Cypriots abandoned their places in parliament and in the administration. 
Since the violence against Turkish Cypriots was severe, in order to preserve the 
guaranties provided in 1960 agreements and stop the violence against the Turks, 
                                                 
7 A dream cherished by Greece that some day all foreign dominated Greek lands would be transferred 
and be greater Greece.  
8 Denktaş, Rauf. “The Crux of the Problem”. Perceptions, Vol. IV, No.3, September-November 
1999, p.7 
9 Polyviou, Polyvios G. Conflict and Negotiaitons 1960-1980, New York, Holmes&Meier Publishers, 
1980, pp.36-38 
10 The object of the plan was to dissolve Republic of Cyprus and to bring about Cyprus with Greece.  
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Turkey threatened the Greek side with intervention in accord with the Treaty of 
Guarantee. Since the negotiations ended in deadlock, the Cyprus question was 
referred to the UN, and the UN decided to deploy a peacekeeping force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) by adopting a resolution. 11 However, with the resolution, it treated the 
remaining Greek Cypriot government as if it were the legitimate government of 
Cyprus by asking the government of Cyprus to take all measures necessary to stop 
violence. 12 For the Turkish Cypriots, the resolution was unfair since they were not 
participating in the government at that time. 
The UN force did not succeed in either protecting Turkish Cypirots from Greek 
Cypriot rebels or to  help them to return to their constitutional positions and after 
three years, a second crisis occurred following the attacks of Greek General Grivas 
to Turkish settlers in 1967. Again, Turkey’s threat of military intervention put 
pressure on US to involve in the conflict, and the efforts of Greek Cypriots to force 
Turks to evacuate the island were not succeeded and, at the and,   the Greek troops 
and  Grivas returned to Greece. But, the position of the parties was not changed until 
the time at which the Greek military coup against the Greek Cypriot government 
took place. 13 
In 1974, the Greek Junta decided to overthrow the Greek Cypriot President 
Makarios, and  declared enosis. At this stage, Turkey intervened militarily in 
accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee and the separate existence of the Turkish 
                                                 
11 Ertegün, N.M. The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
Nicosia North: K. Rüstem ,1984, p.19 
12 The Security Council resolution 186, 4 March 1964. It recommended the creation of a United 
Nations Peacekeeping Force while asking the government of Cyprus to take all additional measures 
necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus. It also called upon all states, including Turkey, 
to refrain any interference in Cyprus.  
13 Polyviou, Polyvios G. Conflict and Negotiations, 1960-1980, New York: Holmes&Meier 
Publishers, 1980, pp.50-53 
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Cypriot people and its administration have appeared after that. 
1.1.2. After 1974 
For the Greek Cypriots, 1974, is the real beginning of the Cyprus question. For them 
it was not a legal intervention, but invasion of their recognized republic. 14On the 
other hand, for the Turkish Cypriots, 1974 Turkish peace operation was a real 
release from the violent Greek hostility. 
In the period beginning in 1974, the position of the Greek Cypriot side has remained 
in the same line with the consideration of removing all the consequences of Turkish 
intervention and reestablishing the Republic of Cyprus convenient to the 1963 
Constitutional modifications of Makarios. Namely, this thought includes the 
withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, the departure of mainland Turkish 
settlers, exclusion of Turkey as a party in any future guarantee arrangements for 
Cyprus and the return of all Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes and properties. 
They also thought that all Cypriots should be able to enjoy fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of movement, settlement and property ownership over the 
whole island.15 
The solution they  seek is an independent, bi-communal, non-aligned federal 
republic that includes the mentioned freedoms. Internationally Cyprus should be one 
state, with a single sovereignty, single international personality, and single 
citizenship. In order to achieve these objectives a strategy was considered by the 
Greek Cypriots. Accordingly, they would try to mobilize the international 
                                                 
14 Ibid, p.157 
15 Stavrinides, Zenon. “Greek Cypriot Perceptions’’, Cyprus: The need for new perspectives, Ed. 
C.H.Dodd, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999,pp. 55-59 
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community effectively to exploit the international factor and to exert intensive 
pressure on Turkey to achieve the solution they desired. 
On the other hand, after 1974, the tendencies of Turkish Cypriots shaped on the 
consideration of protecting their rights given by the 1960 Treaties.16 In other words , 
a solution  based on the  independent, bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic would 
be accepted as starting point for the subsequent  negotiations  by the Turkish side. 
However, this position would change after the Luxemburg European summit of 
1998.17 Following that a federal system that recognize the freedom of movement,  
settlement and the right to property would not have been favored any more by the 
Turkish side. At that point, the desire of the Turkish side can be explained as “ two 
sovereign states’’ or bi-zonal, bi-communal  confederation of pre-existing states. It 
supports a very weak central system, in which each state has extensive powers. 
Furthermore, the separate sovereignty should be granted  for each community based 
on the right of self determination. The continuation of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee 
with the unilateral intervention right of Turkey is another key point for any future 
concept. 18 
1.2.UN Attempts at Settlement  
1.2.1. Bicommunal Talks and the Birth of TRNC 
After the Turkish Peace Operation, the negotiations really started in 1977 under the 
good offices of UN secretary-General with the intercommunal talks between the 
                                                 
16 Clerides, Glafkos. Cyprus . My Deposition.Nicosia: Alithia Publishing ,1990. vol.3,  p.105 
17 Ertegün, Necati M. “The Turkish Cypriot Outlook”. Cyprus: The need for new perspectives. Ed. 
C.H.  Dodd,  Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999. pp.101-102 
18 Soysal, Mümtaz.“ TRNC’s Confederation Proposal”. Proceedings of the international Symposium, 
The Cyprus; Past, Present and the vision for the Future.Ed. Huseyin Gökçekuş. Lefkoşa. Near East 
University. 2001. pp.355-362 
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presidents of both sides, Archbishop Makarios  and President Denktaş. There were 
some initiatives before that, but all of them were interrupted by the refusal of the 
Greek Cypriot side to sit on the negotiation table.  19 At the talks the two leaders 
agreed to four guidelines to establish an independent, bi-communal, bi-zonal federal 
republic. However, little progress was achieved on the basic issues of withdrawal of 
Turkish troops from Cyprus, the departure of  mainland Turkish settlers,  and the 
return of all Greek Cypriot refugees to their properties and the territory. Moreover, 
there were quite a few differences between the considerations of the sides about the 
structure of the new state. While the  Turkish Cypriots wanted to regain the 
provision of 1960 Constitution, Greek Cypriot side was in favor of a much tighter,  
centrally controlled federation. 20  
Despite the fact that, the talks persisted until 1983, no reasonable solution had been 
found. At this stage  the Greek side’s internationalization of the dispute had been the 
main reason for the failure of inter-communal talks resumed  under UN auspices . 
Greek Cypriots preferred   international propaganda by taking  advantage of their 
recognition as the Government of Cyprus to intercommunal talks, and they 
succeeded in it to some extent. As a result of Greeks’ attempts at internationalization 
of the dispute, the UN continued to recognize the Greek Cypriot community  as the 
Government of the republic of Cyprus.21 
In response, the UN’s negative altitude towards the Turkish Cypriots during the 
negotiations, the Turkish Cypriot side declared itself to be the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus in November 1983.  The aim was to emphasize that there have 
                                                 
19 Ertegün, N.M. The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.                            
Nicosia North: K. Rüstem, 1984, pp.19-44                                                                                          
20 Groom, A.J.R.  “The Process of negotiations 1974-1993”. The political, social and economic 
development of Northern Cyprus. Ed.C.C.Dodd. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press ,  1993, pp.15-21 
21 Dodd, C.H. The Cyprus Imbroglio. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1998,p. 38 
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been two sovereign and equal peoples on the island. For the Turkish side thought 
that the only way to establish a federation was by agreement between two equal 
peoples. But the attempts resulted in with the condemnation of UN Security Council 
and the new state was recognized only by Turkey. Moreover, Turkish Cypriots have 
sufferred from the embargoes imposed first by UN and later EU. 
Following the Turkish Cypirots’ declaration of the sovereignty, proximity talks took 
place with the help of the UN Secretary-General Perez De Cuellar. After a series of 
discussions he offered a draft framework agreement in 1986. The agreement would  
provide  a federal, bi-communal, bi-zonal constitution, in many respects similar to 
1960 accords. The document was accepted by the Turkish side with one exception: 
the undefined dates for the implementation of the plan would be written clearly on 
the agreement. On the other hand  TRNC had agreed  to a much stronger federation 
in which the residual powers were kept in the two states.. They had come to accept 
federal sovereignty over all the territory of Cyprus and a single citizenship.  On the 
other side Greek Cypriot government rejected the proposed settlement at the last 
minute. Greek Cypriot President Kyprianou, supposed to be influenced by the Greek 
Government, put some preconditions, namely; the withdrawal of the Turkish forces,  
the repatriation of the settlers to Turkey, effective international guarantees to replace 
the Treaty of Guarantee and  the application of the three freedoms.22 
1.2.2. Set of Ideas 
In 1992, another important development took place on the negotiation process. The 
UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali invited the leaders of the both sides to 
                                                 
22 Groom, A.J.R.  “The Process of negotiations 1974-1993”. The political, social and economic 
development of Northern Cyprus. Ed.C.C.Dodd. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press    1993 pp.26-27 
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discuss a new UN initiative called Set of Ideas under the UN mission of good 
offices. The discussions began with  important issues such as  the territorial 
adjustments and Greek Cypriot displaced persons. At this stage, Boutros Galli 
produced a map that showed the location of Güzelyurt  in the Greek Cypriot zone. 
Furthermore, the major port of the Turkish Cypriot Side, the South of Famagusta 
would have been given to the South. It was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots. 
During the talks, the question of the return of the Greek Cypriots to former property 
in the North remained unsolved. The treaty of Guarantee was to remain and 
demilitarization of the island was agreed on the basis of the gradual reduction of 
forces. Not only the freedoms of movement, residence and property ownership but 
also the return of the Turkish Settlers  were not mentioned in the proposals. 23 Since 
Turkish Side did not accept the property and territorial adjustments, they were 
blamed for the failure of the negotiations.  
Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, agreed with  91 of the 100 paragraphs of the 
Constitutional issues. The right of presidential veto and separate voting on major 
matters in both upper and lower houses of the legislature were accepted by the 
Turkish Cypriots. However, they called for a rotating presidency system, and 
equality in numbers in the Council of Ministers. They also demanded for correction 
on the treatment of sovereignty. Greek Cypriot Side accepted the set of ideas only in 
principle, objecting to parts that they believed might enable the Turkish Cypriots 
hinder the admission to the EU, those on return of the displaced persons, property, 
and others on the status of the Cyprus during the transnational period. 24 Both sides 
could not reconcile their differences and the talks were postponed to be resumed 
                                                 
23 Dodd, C.H. The Cyprus Imbroglio. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1998 pp.44-46 
24 Ibid, pp .46-49 
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after the presidential elections in South Cyprus. 
1.2.3. Confidence-Building Measures  
After the collapse in 1992 of UN’s Set of Ideas, UN tried to persuade the two sides 
to adopt confidence-building measures.  These were essentially to allow the Greek 
Cypriots to reoccupy Maraş lost in 1974, in return to the opening of  Lefkoşa  
international airport for the use of both sides. The second one was very important 
for the Turkish Cypriots since it would greatly reduce the effects of internationally 
supported Greek Cypriot embargo on the North. Despite the hesitation   of Turkish 
Cypriot’s Parliament about the tactics of UN’s piece by piece approach which might 
mean the loss of the best bargaining assets by the North25, the package was accepted 
by the Turkish Side. Conversely, the Greek Cypriots eventually refused the new 
changes proposed through the negotiations and did not accept to continue to the 
negotiations on the Confidence-building Measures. They feared that their 
participation in the talks might give grounds for some degree of recognition of the 
North and block Cyprus’s course towards Europe.  
1.3.Period of Crises  
1.3.1. EU factor 
After the failure of the negotiations on “confiding building measures”, the 
relationship between two sides entered into a stage of complexity, including the 
third parties, namely Turkey, Greece and the EU. It was the beginning of accession 
negotiations with Southern Cyprus that caused a further deterioration of the relations 
                                                 
25Initially the UN called for the cession of Maraş to the UN and then the reopening of Lefkoşa 
Airport.   But there was no guarantee that the Government of Cyprus would not find some excuse for 
closing it down again. For this reason, at this stage TRNC   preferred  one overall solution.  
 14 
between two sides.  
Indeed, the application for accession by the Greek Cypriot administration to the 
European Communities dates back to 1990. Despite the fact that the application of 
Greek Side was on behalf of the island, the European Commission judged the 
feasibility of the accession of Cyprus to the EC positively in 1993 but initially 
suggested reaching  a solution that would bring the division of the island to an end 
should be arrived at between two sides. The EU believed that this acceptance of the 
application would accelerate the process of negotiations and help bring about a 
solution. On the other hand, according to the Turks, the unilateral Greek application 
by the Greek Cypriot side, the endorsement of the Greek Cypriot application by the 
EU council and ongoing membership negotiations since then were totally against the 
Cyprus constitution and international law, and thus have no legal basis. The 
supporting point for the Turkish Cypriots on this idea was that the application to join 
the EU was a breach of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee which required that Cyprus 
could not participate in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever, 
in which both Turkey and Greece are not members. 26 Accordingly, the Cyprus 
Treaties of 1959-60 are still valid because the original signatories of those 
agreement, Greece, Turkey and UK have not agreed to amend them.  
In Corfu summit of 1994, the EU changed its approach and showed an inclination of 
accepting that Cyprus could become a member of EU without reaching a settlement. 
This policy change was resulted from the Greek threat to veto the EU Enlargement 
towards Eastern Europe if Cyprus was not taken on board the list. With this motive, 
                                                 
26 Mendelson, Maurice H. “Keynote Speech”. Why Cyprus Entry Into the European Union Would be 
Illegal, Ed. Turkish Embassy, London: Turkish Embassy 2002, pp.3-10 
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on March 6, 1995 a date was given for the start of the accession negotiations.27 The 
fact that Greece dropped its veto on the Custom Union with Turkey on the same day 
showed that the Turkish government at that time made a great concession on the 
Cyprus issue in return for the approval of Turkey’s acceptance to Custom Union.28  
After the beginning of accession negotiations, the Greek Cypriots saw membership 
of the European Union and rearmament as a means of  securing  their objectives. 
Because, if Cyprus became a EU member, the intervention of Turkey in a EU 
country would become imponderable action and in constitutional matters and in 
many issues raised by the Turks, they would have in advantageous position in the 
negotiations.29 The new policy was confirmed by the Greek Cypriot President  
Glafcos Clerides who stated  that their policy would be based on rearmament, 
military cooperation with Greece and the exertion of   pressure on Turkey through 
EU membership.30 
After 1995, encouraged by the EU membership, Greek Cypriot side put its 
objectives into practice immediately. After signing the  “Common Defense 
Doctrine” with Greece, they raised their armament expenditures31, they started to 
build new air and naval bases for the use of Greek forces and common military 
practices were set up between Greek Cypriot side and Greece. Related to this issue 
Greek Cypriot government  ordered 90 miles range S-300 missiles from Russia and 
                                                 
27 Neuwahl, Nanette. “European Union and Cyprus” Proceedings of the international Symposium, 
The Cyprus; Past, Present and the vision for the Future.Ed. Huseyin Gökçekuş, Lefkoşa. Near East 
University, p.275 
28 Somuncuoğlu, Sadi. Kıbrıs’ta Sirtaki.( Dance on Cyprus) Ankara: Boyut Tan. Mat.,2002 p.173-
185  
29 Clerides’ comment on EU Membership, Phileleftheros , 25 April 1994 
30 Fileleftheros, 7 December 1996 
31 See Security Council resolution 789  which calls upon the Greek Cypriots to decrease their military 
spending. 
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planned to deploy them on the island  for the protection of Air and Naval basis. 32 
Meanwhile, provocative border violations were organized by Greek Cypriot 
leadership and the Greek Orthodox Church . 33  
The Turkish side, in response, the TRNC and Turkey came closer. In December 
1995, a common declaration was signed between two sides in which it was 
emphasized that they only approve the accession of Cyprus to the EU within the 
framework of a definite solution of the Cyprus Problem.34In another common 
declaration on January 20,1997, they announced their intention of creating a concept 
of common defense: any attack against the TRNC would be considered an attack on 
Turkey. Moreover, in the declaration, it was stated that if the accession of the South 
to the EU proceeded, the TRNC and Turkey would accelerate the integration 
process between themselves.35 It was a preventive measure against the Greek 
Cypriots’ aim for indirect enosis through membership in the EU.  Finally, the 
declarations resulted in an agreement which envisaged the establishment of the 
Association Council between Turkey and TRNC, engineering partial integration at 
the economic, military and foreign policy levels.36  
1.3.2. Negotiations 
While the tension between the two sides was increasing, seeing the urgent need for a 
settlement, new initiatives were developed by the UN Security Council in 1996 and 
                                                 
32 These  missiles was able to reach Southern Parts of the Turkey, naturally deployment of them was 
perceived as an casus belli  for Turkey. After the EU’s  warning that  the deployment of these 
missiles was endanger South Cyprus’ accession process, On December 29, 1998,  Clerides decided 
not to deploy the missiles on Cyprus.  
33 Stephen, Michael. The Cyprus Question, London: Northgate Publications, 2001, pp.63-67 
34 Turkey-TRNC Joint Declaration, 28 December 1995, available  in www.mfa.gov.tr  
35 Joint Declaration, 20 July 1997, in available in www.mfa.gov.tr 
36 Tapur, Tuncer. Dünya ve Türkiye-AB-Kıbrıs Üçgeni.( The World and the Triangle of Turkey-EU-
Cyprus), Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları. 2002, pp. 182-187 
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1997. The UN sponsored talks were held first in Troutbeck, between Clerides and  
Denktaş . A “Draft Joint Statement” was presented for consideration by both sides,  
but on the constitutional  issues, especially on the issue of sovereignty there were 
differences between the perceptions of the side. Greek Cypriots criticized the Draft 
Statement as being very negative for their own benefits.  The talks broke up early 
when information came from the EU that accession negotiations with the Greek 
Cypriots would go ahead.37 
Furthermore, in the same document, (Agenda 2000, the outcome of the EU’s 
Intergovernmental Conference)38  it was understood that Turkey would not be 
included in the next wave of applicants whose membership discussion would be 
held with. Despite the EU’s statements on Cyprus’ membership, second round talks 
were held in Glion in August 1997. But similar to the talks held in Troutbeck, the 
Glion meetings brought nothing. Turkish Cypriots stated that the precondition that 
was brought to the talks was the recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration as 
the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.  The Draft Joint Agreement was not 
acceptable to the Greek side either, despite Clerides’ tactical acceptance of it. There 
were serious criticism on the Greek side on the issues of three freedoms of residence 
and the right of return of the Greek Cypriots to their abandoned properties. 39  
In late 1997s, the decisions of the EU council for the memberships of Turkey and 
the Greek Cypriot side at  the  Luxemburg Summit turned the negotiations efforts 
into an impossible situation. With this decision, the EU would not include Turkey in 
the enlargement process for the next decade and concluded to begin accession 
                                                 
37 Dodd, C.H. The Cyprus Imbrogli, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1998.pp.95-103 
38 In the conference Greece strongly stated that if talks with the Republic of Cyprus were postponed, 
she could veto other states’ applications to join European Union.  
39 Dodd, C.H. The Cyprus Imbrogli,. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1998,pp.104-107 
 18 
negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration. 40 In response, the Turkish 
government reaffirmed that the 20 July 1997 agreement between Turkey and TRNC 
would be advanced in step with the beginning of accession negotiations with 
Southern Cyprus. It was concluded by a resolution that any future phase of 
negotiations but it would be based on the reality of the existence of two states in 
Cyprus. 41The invitation of the Greek side  proposed that the North should 
participate in the Cyprus accession negotiations was not accepted by the TRNC 
since it would mean that the Turkish Cypriots recognized the validity of the South’s 
application on behalf of the Island. 42 
Following the developments since Luxemburg Council, to ease the tension on the 
island, the US special presidential envoy Richard Holbrooke proposed a Dayton-
style conference under the chairmanship of the US.43 The proposals  brought by him 
were considered unsatisfactory by the TRNC. He was told by the Turkish Cypriots 
that the continuation of the Cyprus negotiations process should depend on three 
provisions:  providing the conditions that there were two peoples and two 
administrations on the island, withdrawal of  the Greek Cypriots’ unilateral 
application for EU membership, and abolishing of the economic embargo on 
Northern Cyprus. Turkish side put these precondition in order to balance the Greek 
Cypriot position that had enhanced after the Luxemburg European Summit. It was 
also the Greek Cypirots’ entering EU would give them great advantage to play on 
many constitutional issues put forward by the Turkish Cypriots.44 On the other hand   
                                                 
40  Luxemburg European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 12-13 December 1997 
41 Turkish Foreign Preidency, Joint Declaration, 23 April 1998 available in www.mfa.gov.tr   
42 Turkish Foreign Presidency , Statement by president Denktash in response to the  call for Turkish 
Cypriot participation in EU Membership Talks 14 March 1998, available in www.mfa.gov.tr 
43 Cyprus PIO: Turkish Cypriot Press and Other Media, Turkey says quadripartite conference on 
Cyprus is not on the agenda, 23 March 1998 available in www. hri.org  
44 Glafcos Clerides’s statement , Agon, 18 June 1994. 
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Greece and Southern Cyprus did not favor such a conference style negotiations, 
thinking it might lead to international recognition of TRNC. 
 In  late 1999, the relations and negotiations between Turkish Cypriots and Greek 
Cypriots came to a breaking point when it was discovered that  Greece was directly 
involved in the escape of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader  of the PKK terrorist 
organization, to Kenya prior to his capture with a Greek Cypriot passport  in 
February 1999. This was important because it would destroy the confidence for 
reaching  an agreement expected to bring about permanent peace to Cyprus in the 
future. 
1.4.The EU Involvement   
1.1. 1. Changing Perceptions: EU effect   
The relationship that had come to a breaking point between the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot sides gained a new dimension in the year 1999. Despite the fact that the  
subsequent developments have not directly influenced Cyprus negotiations, they 
would be important for the changes of third parties’ outlooks over Cyprus problem 
and thus create a complex atmosphere that indirectly interfere the solution on the 
island.      
The change showed itself  with the change in leadership in Greece from foreign 
minister Pangalos to Papandreou. The new policy would be based on the idea  that 
there were more to be gained from encouraging Turkish membership in the EU than 
from leaving Turkey with no prospect for EU membership. 45 The earthquake of 
                                                 
45 Tank, Pınar.’’ Re-solving the Cyprus Problem: Changing Perceptions of State and Social 
Security’’ in European Security, Vol.11, No.3, Autumn 2003 
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August 1999 became an important pretext for  Greece to demonstrate its new policy. 
Following the earthquake days, social  activities  amazingly increased between 
social groups,  developments  reached volumes within two mounts and the few 
mounts later, at the European Council of Helsinki, Greece supported Turkey’s 
candidacy for full EU membership.46 
Helsinki summit was a beginning of a new approach from the point of view that it 
would change  Turkey’s position in the Cyprus conflict.47 According to the decision 
of  Helsinki summit, the political settlement of the Cyprus problem would not be a 
precondition to accession of the Republic of Cyprus or Turkey to the EU.48  
Indeed, there would be radical departure in the EU’s approach to Turkey after the 
Helsinki summit . At Helsinki, the EU hoped that confirming Turkey’s eligibility 
would aid the drive to finding a solution to the Cyprus issue. Turkey had been 
waiting for confirmation of its candidacy and denied such status in several 
Commission  Opinions and Reports under the pretext of Cyprus conflict  and 
especially after 1990, this policy had negative effect on the Cyprus issue. 49In 
Helsinki, the EU clearly envisaged that by linking the Turkish accession process 
with progress on the resolution of the Cyprus issue, it might  bring pressure on 
Ankara.  The ‘carrot and stick’ policy was the new EU strategy and it was believed 
that the accession process would act as a catalyst for the resolution of the Cyprus 
conflict.50  
                                                 
46 Yalçınkaya, Alaattin. “ From Disaster Solidarity to Interest Solidarity, Turkish Greek Relations”, 
Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Annual 8, 2003, pp.151-152 
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48 Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions ,  Dec. 10-11 
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Although Turkey was reluctant to acknowledge such a connection, at Helsinki, the 
link between the Cyprus problem and the accession of Turkey to the EU was 
created, given that Cyprus and Turkey both became candidates for EU 
membership.51 As planned, the new EU policy affected the  public opinions in 
Turkey and TRNC.  The thought that if Turkey cannot block the Cyprus to the EU-
though it would  be understood at the Helsinki and thereafter-, Greece and Republic 
of Cyprus might jeopardize the accession of Turkey’s membership, has been 
increasingly favored  by the Turkish media and by the businessmen. They were 
convinced that Turkey should not sacrifice the prospect of EU membership because 
of the Cyprus problem  52 Moreover in TRNC, the public began to interrogate the 
costs of the status quo. The fear was that economic problems and isolation would 
lead to their disappearance from Northern Cyprus through immigration. 
1.4.2. New Initiatives 
After the Helsinki Summit, new initiatives were put into practice by the UN in 
December 1999, hoping that the new Turkish position confirmed at Helsinki would 
inspire a more flexible attitude from the Turkish side. 53 Five round of proximity 
talks were held under the UN Secretary-General’s mission of good offices between 
Clerides and Denktaş from  3 December 1999 to 10 November 2000. At the 
beginning of the talks, Annan emphasized that there would be no precondition.54 In 
the first three rounds, the parties remained firm on their positions: the Turkish 
Cypriot’s demanded to be recognized as an equal and sovereign partnership, the 
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Greek Cypriot’s insist on unitary sovereignty.55At the beginning of fourth round in 
September 2000 the UN Secretary-General Annan confirmed that the two peoples 
on the Island are politically equal parties who do not represent each other. He  also 
underlined the need for the two parties to reach a comprehensive settlement through 
talks in which they would participate as equals. 
The Turkish side appraised Annan's statement as a positive approach  towards the 
solution and recognition of the reality in the island. Greek Cypriots showed their 
reaction by boycotting the proximity talks until assured that they would take into 
account UN resolutions that required a federal solution. At the fifth round a paper 
entitled "Oral Remarks" was presented by the UN Secretary-General to the two 
sides on November 8, 2000 and the talks broke up after the announce of Denktaş 
about his withdrawal from the talks stressing that the paper outlined a federal 
solution. 56 Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, supported the announcement of 
Denktaş in his statement saying that no result could be obtained from the talks as 
long as the existence of two states in Cyprus was not recognized. 57 
In the one year period beginning with the failure of the proximity talks, the meetings 
between the  two sides came to a halt because of Denktaş’ and Turkish 
Government’s decision to abandon the negotiations. But the pressure came from the 
international area , namely from the US and the EU, made the two sides return to 
negotiation table again towards the end of 2001. Furthermore on the Turkish side, 
there was internal pressure coming from the Turkey’s economic difficulties and 
their impact of Northern Cyprus. Consequently, Denktaş invited Clerides to face-to-
                                                 
55 Turkish Daily News, 7 July 2000 
56 Turkish Foreign Ministry, Recent Developments on Cyprus Issue-Process of Negotiations in 
www.mfa.gov.tr 
57 Anadolu Ajansı ( Anatolia Agency), 24 November 2000 
 23 
face talks in which third parties would not participate. The UN Special Adviser in 
Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, was allowed to present for the purpose of note taking. 
During the talks, Turkish side proposed a Partnership state to be founded by two 
separate existing states. The proposal was rejected by Greek Cypriot side despite the 
fact that Denktaş put forward his proposal by strengthening the central government  
authority addressing  the objections of Clerides. Greek Cypriots thought that the 
partnership state proposal was just a trick to prepare the way for the partition of the 
island. However in the talks the two sides agreed to enter into direct talks in January 
2002.  
The direct talks began under the presence of UN Secretary General, Alvaro De Soto, 
on January 16 2002. During the talks, de Soto made some suggestions to assist the 
parties but no result was achieved.   
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CHAPTER 2: THE EU INVOLVEMENT AND THE KOFI ANNAN PLAN 
2.1. The Background of the Plan 
Since the UN sponsored face-to-face talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
did not produce a successful outcome, the UN believed that the two sides were not 
able to reach an agreement without third party assistance. Eventually the UN 
Secretary General presented a comprehensive settlement proposal, on November 11, 
2002, a first revision on 10 December and a second revision on 26 February 2002. 
The initial objective was that the plan would be agreed on by the time of EU 
Copenhagen summit on 12-13 December 2002 in which the membership of Cyprus 
would be approved. At this point, the timing of it with its initial deadline for the 
final answer was the real indicator of EU involvement on Cyprus Issue.  
Indeed the UN have recognized the EU as a side recently. Before the plan was 
prepared, throughout  2000 and 2001, the UN Secretary-General special adviser had 
several contacts with the officials of the European Commission in order to form an 
opinion of how the Cyprus issue could be held in the context of the accession to the 
EU of a reunited Cyprus.58  After these consultations the European Union stated that 
it would never be an obstacle to find a solution to the Cyprus problem and 
accommodate whatever arrangements the parties themselves agreed to in the context 
of political settlement.59 Besides, the commission repeated the position that 
Cyprus’s EU accession would go on irrespective of a political settlement. On the 
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other hand, there was a fear that the Turkish Cypriots had engaged in direct talks to 
delay EU membership, because they had a clear timetable for the accession of 
Cyprus. However, a solution should have been found before May 1, 2004, the time 
in which Cyprus would be a member of the European Union. The EU did not want 
to face all the problems posed by the entry of a divided Cyprus in the EU.  
With the prospect mentioned above, the plan was prepared by the assistance of the 
British, Americans  and the EU diplomats by taking into consideration of the 
interests of the EU and conflicting parties. Moreover, it was said that the Greek 
Cypriots were actively involved in the forming process without the information of 
the Turkish side.60 
In presenting the core of the plan, the drafters made extensive use of the EU 
framework. While the plan was constructed, several European models were 
mentioned such as Belgium and Switzerland. But the most discussed model was the 
Belgium one. Before presentation of the plan, this model was also referred to by the 
Turkish Prime minister, Tayyip Erdoğan. In his speech, he stated that the Belgium 
model could be accepted by Turkey as a  solution for Cyprus. 61  
But the reality was that, such a model on Cyprus would be very difficult to 
implement since there are vast differences between Cyprus and Belgium. Belgium is 
a small-to-medium size state with two main cultural communities and it has 
restructured its political system in several stages from being a centralized state to a 
largely decentralized one. In Belgium there are two major communities, the Flemish 
and the Wallons. Each of these entities has its own government, which performs as 
                                                 
60 The Speech of Michael Stephen. International Conference of Cyprus, Ankara; TOBB,  2nd session,  
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many functions as possible. 62 On the other hand, in Cyprus, the process is a bit 
different from Belgium because the plan would integrate the two communities that 
had lived separately more than 30 years.  
Moreover, the communities in Belgium are much more balanced in size than the 
communities in Cyprus, where the proportion between Turkish and Greek Cypriot is 
1:4. Furthermore the linguistic and religious separation between the two sides in 
Cyprus were completely ignored at this stage. In so far as the relations with the EU 
were concerned, in Belgium  each entity represents its own case in the council of the 
EU, although presenting it for the Belgian State as a whole. When the European 
Commission issues a proposal, it is sent to the Belgian Permanent Representative to 
the EU and then the representative sends it to the federal and each of the regional 
governments. 
 Each of these governments defines its position and expresses it at weekly meetings 
of the Directorate for EU Affairs chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These 
meetings determine the position to be taken by Belgium in the EU council of 
Ministers, and instructions are given to whoever will represent Belgium there. There 
has to be agreement on the part of the federal and regional governments, because 
there exists no legal hierarchy between the levels of government. 63 At that point it is 
clear that such an agreement would be very difficult between Greek and Turkish 
sides.  
The other model mentioned before the presentation of the plan was the Swiss one. 
The system is also different from Cyprus. When  we look at that country, we see that 
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it took hundreds of years to develop its present system. First, the German-speaking 
cantons formed single Congress to combine their efforts in security for a better life. 
Later in the nineteenth century, the French-speaking and Italian-speaking areas of 
Switzerland joined the confederation on the basis of equality. The Swiss constitution 
provides full equality for all cantons and each canton is sovereign so far as its 
sovereignty can not be limited by the federal constitution. Moreover, in Switzerland 
the cantons have full authority over the tree freedoms( freedom of movement, 
settlement and land ownership) and these freedoms can be restricted by the 
government of the cantons. Such measurement guarantees the structure of the 
cantons against the drastic change  in demographically and linguistically. In Cyprus 
on the other hand, the implementation of EU aquis will make such a sovereignty be 
impossible. Moreover, in Switzerland the Cantons have full authority over the tree 
freedoms( freedom of movement, settlement and land ownership) and these 
freedoms can be restricted by the government of the cantons. Such measurement 
guarantees the structure of the cantons against the drastic change demographically 
and linguistically. 64 In Cyprus, on the other hand, the demographic structure and the 
historical background is different  from Switzerland the implementation EU aquis 
would make such a sovereignty be impossible.  
2.2.Annan Plan 
2.2.1.State Structure  
Despite the fact that these two models do not fit the demographic structure of 
Cyprus, the Belgian and the Swiss models are presented as a reference to the plan so 
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that it barrowed from several aspects of the confederal Swiss constitution as well as 
the Belgian federal constitution.  
According to the UN Plan, Cyprus would be an independent state with a common 
government and two equal ‘constituent states65’. The relationship between these 
structures is modeled on the status and the relationship of Switzerland. Accordingly, 
the plan specifies that the United Cyprus Republic has a single international legal 
personality and sovereignty, and the partition or secession is specifically 
prohibited.66  
In the common state, the legislative power is composed of two chambers, the Senate 
and the Chamber of Deputies.  The Senate would be  composed of an equal number 
of Senators from each component state. On the other hand,  the membership in the 
lower house of the legislature, the Chamber of Deputies, would be composed in 
proportion to person holding internal constituent state citizenship status of each 
constituent state provided that each component state would be no less than 12 seats. 
The decisions taken in the both chambers would require simple majority  including 
one quarter of voting Senators from each component states. In special matters such 
as finance, foreign affairs, election of executive presidential council and the 
immigrants, a special majority of two-fifths of sitting and voting would be needed in 
the Senate.67 
In 1960 constitution, the legislative power was  under the responsibility of the  
House of Representatives. The house  representatives  would consist of  35 Greek 
and 15 Turkish members. The representatives were elected by two societies for five 
                                                 
65 In the  initial version of the plan, the term was ‘component state’ rejected by the Turkish Cypriots 
and consequently ‘constituent sate’ was used in the third version of the plan.  
66 The Annan Plan , Appendix.A: Foundation Agreement, Article 2 
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years.68  For amendments in constitution and issues such as elections, municipalities 
and taxes, separate majorities of two third of Turkish and Greek Cypriot members 
was necessary.69 Furthermore, each community had its Communal Chambers 
composed of a number of representatives which itself determine. The Communal 
Chambers had the right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community 
to provide their needs.70 The difference between two constitution arises on the 
voting system. In 1960  constitution the separate majorities of the Turkish and Greek 
members in the voting   was giving a political equality to the Turkish Cypriots. In 
the Annan Plan, in order to meet the demands of the Greek Cypriots for more 
functional constitution, and prevent deadlock in the decision making system, the 
voting was rearranged, and with this provisions it remained behind the 1960 
Constitution.    
In the Annan Plan, the executive power would be exercised by the Presidential 
Council, the Office of Head of State. The Presidential council would include six 
members elected on a single list by special majority in the senate and approved by 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The composition of the council would be 
according to the proportion of the numbers of citizens of each state, though the 
members from each state would not be less than two. The council would take 
decisions by simple majority, provided that at least one member of the Turkish 
Cypriot constituent state members have to be included. Each member of the Council 
would head a department. The heads of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and the 
European Union would not come from the same component state. The offices of 
President and Vice-President of the Council would rotate in ten months period 
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among the Council and  the President and Vice- President would not have the right 
to vote.71 
The community quotas of the Council of Ministers  in 1960 Constitution was the 
same as it was in the Annan Plan. However, the Turkish population included the 
control of at least one major ministry such as foreign or home affairs. Decisions 
were taken with majority and different from the Annan Plan,  the Vice President had 
the veto power, for instance.72  
At the common State level the judiciary would include a Supreme Court which is 
the only institution that will provide the functioning of the state and control the 
relationship between the ‘common state’ and the ‘constituent state’. In the Court 
there would be equal number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges. 
Additionally, three non-Cypriot judges would come from the outside of Cyprus in 
order to prevent the deadlock in the Supreme Court. 73In the 1960 constitution,  
there was an equal number of Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges in the Supreme 
Court. However a rotating Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot  President was neutral 
and did not have the right to vote. 74 
In the Annan Plan, the common state would be responsible for external relations 
including conclusion of international treaties and defense policy, relations with the 
EU, issuance of currency, monetary policy and banking regulations, budget, indirect 
taxation( customs and excise), meteorology aviation, international navigation, 
continental shelf,  territorial waters, national resources including waters75,  
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73 The Annan Plan , Appendix A: Foundation Agreement, Article 6 
74 London and Zurich Agreements, Annex A, article 16 
75 Before the second revision, the water resources was under the control of the ‘constituent state’.   
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communication, Cypriot citizenship, immigration, combating terrorism, pardons and 
amnesties, intellectual property, weighs measures and antiques. 76 Furthermore the 
relationship with the EU would be exercised by the common state. In the plan, much 
of the legislations in this fields would be  under the responsibility of the EU. One of 
the main differences between  the 1992  ‘Set of ideas’ UN proposal and the new 
plan was that in the former, these legislations on these fields were exercised by the 
federal institutions.  . 
At the ‘constituent state’ level, the residual powers would be vested with the 
‘constituent state’ such as tourism, agriculture industry and commerce, fisheries, 
zoning and planning sports and education, social security, health, labour, family, 
company and criminal law. 77 The constituent states would able to have commercial 
and cultural relations with other countries in accordance with the constitution. 78   
Regarding the relationship between the common and the constituent states, the plan 
also had some provisions. Accordingly, there would be no hierarchy between the 
federal and constituent state laws. However, the legislative could be  regulated in a 
manner binding upon the federal government and the constituent states. The laws 
approved by the federal parliament and both constituent state legislatures would 
have superiority over any other federal and constituent state law. 79 
2.2.2.Territory and Property  
 Before the Annan Plan, the area under TRNC control is slightly more than 36 
percent of the entire territory of the island including 57 percent of the coastline. 
                                                 
76 The Annan Plan, Annex 1, article 14, para.1 
77 Ibid, article 16, para.3 
78 Ibid, para.2 
79 Ibid, para.1 
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According to the third version of the Annan Plan, the 28 percent of the area would 
be left to the Turkish side. In this way, the TRNC would lose 21 percent of its 
territory. Moreover, the areas proposed for return include the fertile areas of 
Güzelyurt/ Motphou. 80 In 1992 set of ideas, the proportion of the area of the 
Turkish side was approximately the same. The difference was that, in the new map,  
Karpas would be  left under Turkish Cypriot jurisdiction.  
As an important consequence of the territorial adjustment, although the UN 
estimated the actual number lower, according to Turkish side,  from the territories 
given up, some 47,000 inhabitants  possibly relocated in the TRNC. On the other 
hand, combine with the number of persons who would be affected by replacement of 
the properties  in the Turkish Cypriot Side,  the UN estimates the figure of the 
persons being dislocated as 67,000 persons81, but the Turkish Cypriot Government’s 
estimate was about 100, 000.82 
Relevant to the territorial adjustment, the plan pictures a Relocation Board in order 
to control and coordinate the vacation and relocation of the current inhabitants.83 
The plan provides some easiness for the inhabitants to leave. Accordingly, the 
current inhabitants who are not financially in sufficient position to return or relocate 
will be able to request at least three months for the vacation of their properties and 
they will be provided with transport for their belongings. The persons who are not 
Cypriot citizens would be paid for financial assistance for the return to their 
                                                 
80 Efegil, Ertan. Temel konular isiginda Annan Belgesi'nin analizi : anayasal duzenleme. ( The 
analysis of the Annan Plan in the light of basic issues: constitutional arrangement) Istanbul: 
Gundogan Yayinlari , 2003 pp.27-28 
81 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, Territory  ,1 April 2003. 
United Nations S/2003/398, para.112-119  
82 Ibid, p.119 
83 The Annan Plan, Annex 6, article 7 
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homeland.84 Accordingly this amount would be at least 10,000 Euros for a 
household of four and it will be paid in cash in 5 years after their arrival to their 
motherland. 85    
Regarding the properties affected as a consequence of the conflict between the two 
sides since 1963, the Annan Plan introduced a complex formula including 
reinstatement, long term lease, compensation, sale an exchange. In these areas, 
except for the belongings owned by institutions, used for public benefit and military 
purposes and for the religious sites, the properties would be returned to their initial 
owners. The Churches and the pious foundations( Evkaf) would have the right to 
reinstate on any affected property owned by them which was used as a religious site 
in 1963 or 1974 without any acceptation mentioned in the other chapters of the plan. 
Considering the other exceptional territories, the plan envisages the choice of the 
exchange for compensation and exchange for the payment of thecurrent value. 86 
Concerning the regulations in the plan, the dispossessed owners  would have the 
right to claim either compensation  for their properties or the reinstatement. 
Optionally, they would also be able to chose the other ways, such as the sailing, 
long-term ease or exchange of their properties. But If the properties of those 
returning refugees belong to a displaced person, or been converted for public use, 
they would be able to claim for compensation or apply for the exchange. The 
amount of compensation would be determined according to the current value 87of 
                                                 
84 Ibid, article 5 
85 These provisions were put with the second revision. In the Initial plan there were not such easiness.  
86 The Annan Plan, Annex 7, articles 4, 7,8,9 
87 Value of a property at time of dispossession, plus an adjustment to reflect appreciation based  on 
increase in average  in comparable locations in Cyprus. Before the revision the compensation  was 
determined according to the value of the property at the time of dispossession plus inflation. With the 
revision the amount of the compensation would be more higher.  
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this land. 88 
The plan also includes some measures in favour of current users. The current users 
of a property designated for reinstatement  would be able to continue to use the 
property for their own purposes for up to three years. In the event of that, the current 
user would have to pay rent for the period of continued use of the affected property. 
Furthermore the current users, until they are able to buy or lease a property for 
alternative accommodation by  paying  rent  for their using the property. 89  
In the areas subject to the territorial adjustment, the  current users who have the 
Cypriot citizenship  would be able to remain in the same area and purchase property, 
or return to their former residence or receive comparable residence in northern 
Cyprus. But if the current users are not Cypriot Citizens, they would return to the 
‘constituent state’ in which they are legally resident. The plan also put an  obligation  
for the return of the dispossessed persons; the reinstatement would not be possible 
for more than 20 percent of the residences and land in any village or town and for 
more than 10 percent of the residences and land in either constituent state.  90  
Under the property arrangements, the UN estimated that the number of current users 
in the Turkish Cypriot State who might have to move from where they currently live 
would be 15,000 to 18,000 persons. But the actual number is supposed to be lower 
than this estimate because relatively low percentage of refugees would choose to 
return to live in constituent state not administered by their own community. These 
would probably include a very low number of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons 
because of the financial problems that will be touched on in the third chapter of this 
                                                 
88 The Annan Plan, Annex 7, article 6 
89 The Annan Plan, Annex 7, articles 12,13,14 
90 The Annan Plan, Annex 7, article 6 
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study.  
2.2.3. Citizenship and the Exercise of Political Rights 
In Cyprus it is a reality that there are two peoples. From these groups, the number of 
citizens in the Greek Cypriot side is aproximitly 700,000. In the north the number of 
Turkish Cypriot citizens is 200,000. During the negotiations before the presentation 
of the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriot side had the idea that there should be one 
Cypriot citizenship and that it should include only the people who were citizens of 
the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 and their descendants. 91The Turkish Cypriot side, 
on the other hand demanded the recognition of existing citizenship rolls and dual 
citizenship for the future.92 In the ‘general provisions ’ of the Annan plan, it is 
concluded  that there would be one Cypriot citizenship and this citizenship status is 
highlighted in the third article of the federal law on citizenship of the new Cyprus 
state. The plan also brings up an internal (constituent state) citizenship status which 
would be relevant notably for the exercise of voting at the federal level.  
Accordingly, by the entry of the agreement into force, the persons  who held Cypriot 
citizenships in 1963 and their descendants and the spouses of these citizens would 
be required citizens of the United Cyprus Republic.93 Additionally, a list of 45,000 
persons to be given to the UN Secretary-General would be accepted as Cypriot 
                                                 
91 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, Territory  ,1 April 2003. 
United Nations S/2003/398, para.102 
92 Ibid, para.113 
93 These regulations was different in the first and second versions.  In the first version,  the  persons 
who held citizenship in 1960 and their descendants,  18 years of age or older  Cyprus born persons 
who has permanently resided at least seven years in Cyprus,  the ones who is married to a Cypriot 
citizens and have permanently resided for at least two years in Cyprus and  their minor children 
would be considered Cyprus citizens.  In the second version the paragraph b was changed so that any 
18 year old or older persons, not required to be born in Cyprus, who has permanent residence in 
Cyprus for at least seven years before reaching the age of 18 and for at least one year during the last 
five years and their permanently residing children would be the Cyprus citizens.  
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citizen.94 The contents of the list would be prepared according to the specific 
criteria. First, 18 year old or older persons who had permanent residence in Cyprus 
for at least seven years before reaching the  age of 18 and for at least one year 
during the last five years and their minor children and  second,  the persons who 
have permanent residence in Cyprus more than seven consecutive years, may apply 
to be taken onto the list. The applications would be evaluated by the Citizenship 
Board, in accordance with the priorities mentioned in the articles. Any person who 
is not included in the list wrongly would be able to turn to  this board for 
correction.95  
Regarding the second type of citizenship, at the time of the agreement’s being into 
force, the Cypriot citizens would automatically be given internal Cypriot citizenship 
status of the ‘constituent state’  which administer the territory where they reside.  
The citizens in some Moranite96 villages administered by the Turkish Constituent 
state would be able to select to have the internal constituent state citizenship status 
of the other  constituent state within one year.97 Additionally, at the time of  
agreement’s being in force, the Cypriot citizens living outside of Cyprus would 
acquire the citizenship status of the constituent state according to their community to 
which they belonged before 1974. After the entry into force of Foundation 
Agreement, the Cypriot citizens could acquire internal constituent state citizenship 
status of the constituent state in which they reside, provided that they have resided 
there for seven years. The constituent states would be able to regulate the acquisition 
                                                 
94 In the first Annan plan the number was not specified. After the  revision ,  the number was stated as 
33.000 persons but  there were no provisions.  
95 The Annan Plan, Annex 3, article 4.    
In the first and second Annan plans there was not a phrase about the Security Board. With the third 
plan the Citizenship Board was established, and the provisions of the citizenship were changed in 
favor of Turkish side.   
96 Christian Arabic community in Cyprus 
97 This article was added by the second plan. In the third one the number of villages were expended.  
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of their internal constituent state citizenship status of persons coming from the other 
constituent state. 98  
In the Annan Plan, the other important issue related to the citizenship status of the 
constituent state was  the exercise of political rights. The plan provides for the 
exercise of voting rights at the constituent state and local levels on the basis of 
permanent residency rather than internal citizenship status.99 Accordingly, the 
Cypriot citizens would  exercise political rights at the constituent state level at their 
place of permanent resident regardless of their internal constituent state citizenship 
status. But, on the other hand a constituent state would be able to  limit the residence 
of the Cypriot citizens not  holding the relevant constituent state citizenship status. 
For the first six years after the entry into force of the Foundation agreement, the 
limitations would include a moratorium on such permanent residence.100 In addition 
to this article, the constituent state would be able to bring such limitations if the 
number of residents has reached  7 percent of the population of a village or a 
municipality between the 7th and 10th years and 14 percent between 11th  and 15th 
years. Later, it would be also possible for the constituent state to limit the number of 
residents as it reached  21 percent of the population.101  
                                                 
98 This regulation was crucial for the Turkish side since the citizens of any  the constituent state could 
vote only in that place. According to this article, the Greek Cypriots replaced in the Turkish side after 
the agreement in accord with the property arrangements could not participate the voting in Turkish 
Constituent state for at least 7 years. Moreover At the end of the seven years the government of the 
Turkish side would be able to put some provisions to prevent the Greek Cypriots’ being the citizen of 
the Turkish side. In the first and second plan the constituent states  did not have the authority for  the 
citizenship.  
99 In the former versions of the plan the exercise of political rights would be based on the internal 
Constituent state status. Thus the component states would be able to restrict the exercise of political 
rights of the persons holding its internal citizenship status within the limits of European Union Law 
and  the constitution of the new Cyrus state. It is clear that this regulation was open to the arguments, 
and may create problems from the point of implementation. The amendments were done to address 
widespread Turkish Cypriots concerns that the possibility of the changing status would undermine 
the representation of the Turkish Cypriots in the federal institutions and could eventually lead to a 
Greek Cypriot majority in the Turkish Cypriot state.  
100 In the second plan the moratorium was for 4 years. 
101  The Annan Plan , Appendix A,  Article 3, para.4.  
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The plan brought some exceptions for the limitations. After two years from the time 
of  the agreement’s entry into force, the former inhabitants over the age of 65 and 
their spouses would be out of this restrictions.102 Some villages specified in the  
following article would also benefit from these limitations. According to the plan 
both sides and the federal government would be able to review the regulations on 
the residency rights mentioned in the plan.  
The plan limits the residency of the Turkish and the Greek nationals. Accordingly, 
the constituent states would be able to grant permanent residence to nationals of 
their homelands up to a level of 10 percent of the number of their residents. There 
was not a text in the plan about the residency of the persons that reside in the 
European Union countries. 
2.2.4. Security  
The security issue was one of the other important subject that is open to debate. 
Although there was strict differences in interpreting the agreement, during the 
negotiations  the leadership of both Cypriot communities have accepted the 
continuation of the military guarantees of the 1959 Treaty. Article IV of this treaty 
states that in the event of a breach of the provisions of the foundation accords, 
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom start to consult together with respect to the 
measures necessary to ensure performance of those provisions and if  any common 
or concerted action may not be possible, each of the three  guaranteeing powers 
                                                                                                                                         
  The first plan  envisaged  a transitional period of 20 years. The relevant limitations would be 1 
percent for the first three years plus rise 3 percent for every three years after that. But as mentioned 
before the voting rights were not bound to the residence of the people. In the second this number 
would be 8 percent between 5th and 9 years and 18 percent between the 10th and 15th years.  The 
number of residents could not reached the 28 percent of the hole population.By reducing  28 percent 
to 21 percent, the third version of the plan relatively reduced the number of Greek Cypriots to reside 
in the North Cyprus.  
102 This provisions was put in return to the decrease of  percentages mentioned above. There was not 
such an exception  in the first  two version of the plan.  
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would have the right to take action.103 
However the Greek Cypriot side proposes that the Treaty of guarantee would not 
only remain in force but apply the mutatis mutandis to the new state of affairs 
established in the foundation agreement and the Constitution of the United Cyprus 
Republic and cover the territorial integrity of the new state.104 Turkish side on the 
other hand always demanded the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee’s 
provisions for unilateral intervention since at the last resort they would only trust 
Turkey to guarantee the security of the Turkish Cypriot community. 
In the  Annan Plan, the contents  of the treaty of guarantee was expended in accord 
with the demands of Turkish side. Accordingly, the treaty of guarantee would cover 
not only the independence, territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of 
Cyprus but also the territorial integrity , security and constitutional order of its 
component states. 105 On the other hand, it included the Greek Cypriot proposed 
mentioned in the prior paragraph.  
The treaty of Alliance of 1960 agreements was also expended in the Plan. According 
to the new protocol, there would be no Tripartite Headquarters and the provisions of 
the Treaty would apply mutatis mutandis to the commanders of the Greek and 
Turkish contingents who would perform their functions pursuant to the Treaty.106 In 
the treaty the number Turkish and Greek troops that is allowed to remain in the 
                                                 
103 Treaty of Guarantee,  16 August 1960, article 4 
104 With this proposal the Greek Cypriot side considered to include the EU in the Guarantee of treaty 
and the it claimed that the new state of Cyprus should be guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and the 
European Union.  
105The Annan Plan , Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Guarantee, article 1  
 In the first version of Annan plan, it was stated that the other articles of the foundation agreement  
would be superior to the Treaty of Guaranty. This phrase was omitted in the second and third plan in 
accord with the objection of Turkish side claiming that it would harm the right of Turkey’s 
intervention.   
106 The Annan Plan, Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance, article 2  
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island was 6000. 107 After the accession of Turkey to the European Union all troops 
would be withdrawn from Cyprus, and in the case of the accession of Turkey would 
not appear in a time of 10 years, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus would review the 
protocol. 108 
According to the agreement, the location of the contingents would be in the 
boundaries of the constituent states and the troops would have to inform each other 
and  the United Nations from their all movements including their timing, location 
and the purpose at least 48 hours before109 but this would not apply to the United 
Nations peacekeeping force. The UN peacekeeping force would continue to monitor 
the implementation of this agreement and it was free to petrol in any part of the 
Cyprus. Moreover it would chaire the Monitoring Committee composed of 
representatives of the guarantor powers. 
Different from the 1960 accords, with the Additional protocols,  the island would be 
demilitarized and the import of any weapon would be prohibited. The public 
security would be maintained with the police and the United Nation peacekeeping 
force.  
2.2.5. The EU Requirements  
Regarding the European Union the plan includes a protocol that would have 
provided for some derogations and a transitional periods relating to the application 
of the acquis communautarie. In the protocol it was stated that the accession of 
                                                 
107 In the first version of the plan, it would be a four-digit-figure between 1,000 and 9.999 and in the 
second version it was concluded on a figure  between 2,500 and 7.500.  
108 In the first three versions there were not such limitations.  
109 In the first plan the number were not specified. In the second version the timing limitation was14 
days.  With the third version also the amount of the troops subject to the notice and the restricted 
areas for them were expended.  
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Cyprus to the European Union would not prevent the implementation of the 
Foundation Agreement but would contain its regulations in line with the principles 
on which European Union is founded. 
The protocol provides the Turkish Cypriot state to limit the people who have not 
resident at least three years in the Turkish Cypriot state to purchase real property in 
the Turkish Cypriot state. Furthermore the restrictions on the residency rights in the 
constituent states concluded in the previous articles of the foundation agreement  
would be valid on the acguis communautarie of the EU. 110 
Related to this regulations, if the free movement of goods, persons services and 
capital cause serious economic difficulties in the Turkish Cypriot State, the Turkish 
Cypriot authorities would be able take the appropriate safeguard measures for a 
period three years. Then again these measures could be expanded with the consent 
of the Commission.111 However  these measures would not include the trade 
between the EU and the Turkish Cypriot side but for fear that of  the trade will 
damage the competition in internal market, the commission would be able to adjust 
some measures in favor of Turkish side. As an control mechanism, the Commission 
or any member state which considers that Cyprus uses the rights provided for the 
protocol improperly would be able to bring the matter to the   European Court of 
Justice.112 
Additionally the plan provides for Cyprus to accord Schengen acquis( most- 
favoured- nation treatment) for the entry and residency rights for Turkish citizens. 
The arrangements would be negotiated between the commission, Cyprus and Turkey 
                                                 
110 The Annan Plan, Protocol Requested to be attached to the Treaty of Accession of Cyprus to the 
European Union, article 1 
111 Ibid, article 2 
112 Ibid, article 2, para. 3 
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after the entry into force of the Foundation agreement. 113 
The functioning of Cyprus as a European Union member states was also clarified in 
this protocol. Accordingly Cyprus would be presented in the European Parliament 
according to proportional representation, but each constituent state would at least 
cover one third of the Cypriot seats in the European Parliament. 114  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113 The Annan Plan, Protocol Requested to be attached to the Treaty of Accession of Cyprus to the 
European Union, article 3  
114 Ibid, article 5 
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CHAPTER 3: PERSPECTİVES OF THE SIDES 
3.1. TRNC   
 In the Turkish Cypriot side there has been two main stream  of opinion; the national 
alliance  who sees the Annan Plan as an obstacle to the well-fare independent future 
of the  Turkish Cypriot side since it would bring vital problems for the Turkish 
Cypriots, and the ultra Europeanist ones who claim that the EU membership will 
end their isolation and solve their economic problems. Indeed both sides are in the 
same line with the idea that the plan has somehow negative elements unfavorable of 
Turkish Cypriot side, but they have differences on the point that what can  be 
sacrificed and in what degree this sacrifices will  affect the existence of the Turkish 
Cypriots in the future of Cyprus.  
In General, and mostly for the nationalists lead by the president Denktaş, the 
objections arises around the issues such as; the political equality and the dominancy 
in the important common state, the property and territorial arrangements, the  
derogations relating to the application of the acquis communautaie of the EU, the  
protection of bi-zonality and the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee. Regarding to 
regulation on these subjects, the Annan plan has remained unsatisfactory and 
includes some thin points that endanger the future presence of the Turks in the 
Island.  
For the nationalists, among the issues mentioned in the previous paragraph,  the 
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most arguable issue was the sovereignty. The Turkish Cypriots have been rather less 
critical  in other issues in the Annan Plan. In their views, despite the fact that the 
plan is  seeking to set up two new separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot state, it gives 
only partial recognition TRNC and does not respond  the long-established claim of 
the Turkish Cypriots  that include the right of self-determination. As a matter of fact, 
under the system proposed, neither the Greek, nor the Greek Cypriots have the right 
of self-determination. However the Greek Cypriots have some advantages since they 
are given the domination of the ‘Federal Government’. Practically the functions of 
the common state partly cover the those of the constituent states, and the federal 
government has certain responsibilities for the island as a hole, including the control 
of acquis.115 Furthermore the Greek Cypriots have some recognition in the 
international area. If the plan creates friction between two sides after the signing of 
the agreement, there would be nothing for Turkish Cypriots to do. 116  
The other points subject to the objection of the Turkish side is the status of 
Citizenship and thus bi-zonality.  According to the plan, the political  rights at the 
constituent state and local levels would be exercised on the  basis of permanent 
residency. Practically a Greek Cypriot that has the inner citizenship status of the 
South would be able reside in the Turkish Cypriot side  and regardless to his 
permanent residence in the North ,  he would be able to use  its voting rights at the 
federal state level on the basis of his inner citizenship status. By this way he would 
be able to choose the members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.  Owing 
to his   permanent residence is in the North, and the same person also would have 
the opportunity to exercise his the political rights at the local and Turkish 
                                                 
115 The speech of  Prof.Dr. Clement Dodd  in the  International Cyrus Conference. Ankara, TOBB, 1-
2 March 2003.   
116 Şimşir, Bilal. AB, AKP ve Kıbrıs ( EU, AKP and Cyprus),Ankara; Bilgi Yayınevi, 2003, pp.66-71 
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constituent state levels. Consequently this application would spoil  the 1:4 veto 
power of Turkish side in the senate. 117 Considering the proportion of the Turkish 
and Greek population, the fear is that the Greek Cypriots with their voting rights in 
the North would spoil the autonomy of the Trukish Cypriot state  and the bi-zonality 
principle in favor of Greek Cypriot side.  
Considering the economic aspects of the Annan Plan,  the Turkish Cypriots was 
very cautious about the economic consequences of the Annan plan. . Indeed this 
issue was very much related to the territorial arrangements. As mentioned in the 
second chapter, as a result of  the  implementation of Annan Plan,  at least 80, 000 
Turkish Cyppirots would be displaced and would have to migrate to the Turkish 
side. Of course this migration would  mean that these persons have to end  their  
economic activities , and as a result of  this migration  the government will have to 
find new habitation  areas and create new jobs for the displaced person.118 TRNC 
has not such an economic capacity to take measures against such an high degree 
migration. In the plan, there is no clear arrangements especially in terms of founds, 
that in what fields these persons would be placed and how the Turkish side would 
finance this replacement.119 
Related the to the economic subject the other important point  was  the application 
of EU acquis which is  supposed to lead to Greek Cypriot economic domination. 
Indeed, even if the Turkish Cypriots joined the EU without settlement, the EU 
would enable the Greek Cypriots absorb the northern economy since its economy is 
                                                 
117 The speech of  Prof.Dr. Turgut Turhan  in the  International Cyrus Conference. Ankara, TOBB, 1-
2 March 2003.   
118 As a result of these objections, by the initiatives of the UN and USA, it was stated that an 
international  donation conference will be established in order to collect money for the support of the 
agreement.  
119 The speech of Dr. Ahmet Zeki Tulunç, the TRNC ambassador, in the conference on Turkey EU 
Relations and Cyprus, 3-4 March 2004.   
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17 times larger than the Turkish Cypriots economy.120 For this reason, in order to 
preserve the political and economic presence of the Turkish Cypriots, the adaptation 
of the derogations  to acquis communautarie  is of vital  importance.  
Regarding the derogations, the other issue which the Turkish side is curious about is 
the decision of the European Court of  Human Rights on the property that has 
handed over after the 1974 Turkish peace operations.  During the negotiations of the 
Annan plan, the ECHR has temporarily suspended taking up the applications of the 
Greek Cypirots  related to the right of compensation due to the property 
arrangements since 1974. The Annan plan emphasized that after entry into force of 
the Agreement these applications would be handled in the Republic of United 
Cyprus. However as the court decide on this issue,  this derogation will not be 
binding and it can verdict against Turkey.  121 In order to decrease the affect of the 
EU, during the negotiations Denktaş presented a proposal envisaging that northern 
Cyprus become an EU member at the same time with Turkey and therefore the 
implementation of the Annna plan be postponed until Turky’s membership. By this 
way it would be possible to protect the Turkish Cypriot presence on the island. 122 
Despite these  objections of the nationalists, the views of the pro-EU parities lead by 
the Mehmet Ali Talat was much different. They believe that the Annan plan would 
provide them with sufficient autonomy and safeguard them with prosperity under 
the EU  Umbrella. For them the provisions of the Annan Plan are acceptable. But on 
the other hand these parties’ views are not change very much from the first version 
                                                 
120 Interview with Gündüz Aktan, European Rim Policy and investment Council, Perihelion 
Interviews, 13 August 2003 available in www.erpic.org/perihelion/interviews/aktan.htm 
121 The Speech of Christian Heinze, in the  International Cyrus Conference. Ankara, TOBB, 1-2 
March 2003 
122 News , “President Denktaş: we are not at the position to sign the agreement” , 12 December 2002 
available in www.trncinfo.com 
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to other versions. But the first version of the plan was much far away from the last 
ones regarding to the sufficiency of the Turkish side.  
3.2. The Greek Cypriot Side 
Initially the Greek Cypriots stated that they were ready to negotiate on the basis of 
Annan Plan,  but during the negotiations they oppose almost every provision of the 
Plan and the newly elected Papadapoulos government called for radical changes to 
the text.  In general they seemed to satisfy with only the territorial arrangements. In 
other issues the view of the Greek Cypriot side remained the same with  the  
traditional ones.  
First they think that the plan essentially leads to the dissolution of their state 
established in 1960  and create a new federal government. According to them, the 
new federal state proposed in the plan was a loose one, and they would want a 
stronger state. The Constituent states are too strong that it will undermine the unity 
of the common state.123 With these provisions, like the 1960 constitution, the 
proposed system is dysfunctional as it gives  the  veto powers granted to the Turkish 
Cypriots.  
Economically according to the Greek side  that the implementation of the Annan 
Plan would bring a lot of problems. The three state structure would entail an 
enormous in public sector increase. Furthermore for the cost of the compensation for 
the settlers wishing to return to Turkey and for the properties that will not return the 
initial owners would be very high and according to them the financial burden of the 
                                                 
123 News, “Cyprus President in address to the Annan Plan calls for ‘no’ vote” available in 
www.Greekembassy.org  
 48 
plan would fall on the Greek Cypirots.124 For them, turkey should hold the 
responsibility for this cost because it invaded Cyprus and responsible for  all  these 
consequences.  
Regarding the security issue, they oppose also the demilitarization of the island, 
from their point of view  that the Turkish troops on the island should leave before a 
settlement is signed. The other hand the national Guard should remain because  the 
demilitarization of the island  would resulted in the Cyprus exclusion of the 
common European defense policy. They oppose also the status quo that would be 
constructed with the Annan Plan, Accordingly  it can not  be accepted  that  Cyprus 
would be the only EU  member under foreign guarantee and with troops from a non-
EU country on its soil.  
The derogations in the plan as for the Turkish Cypriot side was issue subject to the 
objection of the Greek Cypriot side. They thought that the early settlement of the 
Cyprus problem before the accession of Cyprus to the EU would secure derogations, 
especially in the case of three freedoms. This idea especially claimed by the new 
president Tassos Papadapulos who came into power after presidential election of 
February 2003. He claimed that the EU should accommodate  all derogations , 
especially those relating to the three freedoms and  European Court Decisions. 
Different form these views there were other objections. For them the  remaining of 
the Turkish settlers would be legalized in the plan and they wanted  these settlers 
turn back to Turkey. On property  issue,  they have also disapproved the property 
arrangements. They thought the proposal was highly complicated, ambiguous and 
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force the owners give up their property rights and this violates international law.  
As mentioned before the opposition of the Greek Cypirot side indeed completely 
included the hole Annan Plan. Despite the fact that some issues such as the 
derogations and the application of the EU acquis, gaining dominancy in the 
common state are in favor of them, the new government participate in the 
negotiations to block the peace process in order to save time before 1 May 2004. 
125The idea is that after the entry to the EU, the EU will be a side in the conflict and 
since Turkey wishing to be a member of European Union they would able to gain 
advantage as an member state. According to them, once Cyprus  joins the EU 
Turkey will feel  be pressurized to be more compliant and it lose any bargaining 
power on Cyprus issue. Thus they would be able to take more than the Annan Plan 
or at least be in a stronger position to reject any provisions that contravened the EU 
acquis. 
3.3. The Third Parties: Turkey, Greece and the EU 
 3.3.1. Turkey 
Similar to  TRNC, the views of government,in Turkey, the  institutions,  media and 
the nongovernmental groups seems to be divided on the Cyprus issue. However 
after the general election on November 2002,  the new government lead by the 
Tayyip Erdoğan have had the intensions to put pressure for solving the Cyprus 
problem along the line of the Anna Plan. 126  
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 Indeed there was not much difference between Turkey and Turkish Cypriots and 
the government stated that Ankara agreed with the objections of the Denktaş to 
certain aspects of the Annan Plan. However the government was ready to 
compromise on the  Plan whatever the result would be. Of course under this 
tendency the government have some motives and fears regarding to the Cyprus 
issue. 
First it is clear that the EU play an important role in views of the AKP government 
since its main goal is to begin to the European Union accession process. The EU 
clearly stated that the Turkey should set the Copenhagen criteria for beginning the 
accession negotiations and this criteria would not only offer the democratization of 
Turkey but also solve the Cyprus Problem. 127 The Turkish prime minister Erdoğan 
declared that “no solution is not a solution” and he was supported by the media and  
the economic organizations which have  expected to gain much from the 
membership of Turkey into the EU. 128 
The other motive  that push Turkish Government put pressure on Denktaş to accept 
the Annan Plan was the fear that,  if Cyprus joined EU as an divided status, Cyprus 
dispute, which was and intercommunal or Greco-Turkish dispute  would become a 
EU-Turkey dispute and this implicates some problems in the context of political, 
security  and military implications. Furthermore if Cyprus become a member of the 
EU as an divided island, this would give the Greeks an effective greater extent to 
block the Turkish accession to the EU without resolution of the Cyprus issue. Beside 
this,  the inclusion of the Turkish Cypriots in the EU would have added some  
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benefits of making Turkish an official EU language and maybe help to lower the 
psychological barrier to Turkey’s eventual accession.  
Lastly the decision of the ECHR on the Loizidou case129  forced Turkish Goverment  
agree on the Annan Plan. There are thousands of applications like that, and in case 
of  that the Court continue to rule such  cases similarly the Turkey would have to 
pay billions of Euros for the Greek Cypriots residents whose territory remain in the 
TRNC after 1974.     
On nationalist side, the opposition parties have the idea that the Cyprus issue would 
be defended and Turkey should continue to  support the TRNC otherwise it would 
be mean that Turkey leave the  legal and historical rights and national interests on 
the Cyprus.  Cyprus is strategically  important for Turkey  since it controls the 
middle east and thus the oil transport lines. With these features, a internationally 
recognize  Cyprus  would increase the role of Turkey in the middle east in positive 
way.130 They have claim that Greek Cypriot membership in the EU implies a form 
of ‘backdoor enosis’. Thus if Cyprus is controlled by the Greek Cypriots, in the 
event of a conflict with the Greece, Turkey will be encircled in Anatolia.131 Beside 
this, a Cyprus under the control of Greece will lessen the Turkey hand in the Aegean 
dispute. 132According to them the Cyprus issue and the accession of Turkey to the 
EU are irrelevant and Cyprus would become an internationally recognized 
independent state.  
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3.3.2. Greece 
Greece’s intervention to the Greek Cypriot government on reaching an agreement is 
not as strong as the Turkish government’s on the TRNC. Unlike the relation 
between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey government, the Greece did not play an 
important role in on the Greek Cypriots perceptions. As a matter of fact both of 
them, shared the same incentives; to make Cyprus a EU member state and delay the 
agreement until the membership of the Cyprus in the EU was assured. With this 
strategy, they would not only reach their goal of enosis but also strengthen the 
Greek Cypriots bargaining power by making the EU as a side. In any case, Greece 
would be in the win-win position.   
Following the mentioned strategy, during the negotiations, the Simitis Government  
spoke in favor of negotiations based on the Annan Plan while reiterating its support 
for the Greek Cypriots despite his domestic opposition which hinted  at the Greek 
Cypriot negotiating team’s readiness to sell Cyprus off.  133The Greece Government  
supported the agreement  for tactical reasons to secure Greek Cypriots’ EU 
membership .  
This claim was proved  after the signature of the Accession Treaty of Cypriots on 16 
April 2003.Guaranteeing the Greek Cypriots accession to the EU,  the Greece 
Government began to say that they would be in full respect to the decisions of the 
Greek Cypriots Government. However , Mr.Karamanlis expressed their disbelief as 
far as the essence of the plan is concerned, especially on its functionality, the issue 
of settlers and the application of EU aquis.134  The Greek government has continued 
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its support for the Greek Cypriots even after the election that resulted with the 
victory of nationalist Tassos Papadopoulos.  At that point, since Papadopoulos 
clearly was opposing the Plan,   it would be  hard to say that Greece was in favor of 
Annan Plan 
Despite the fact that Greece have been succeeded in   by  the signature  of Greek 
Cypriots’ Accession Treaty, 135 later the statements of the Greek politicians showed 
that the Greece would   continue to use the EU ‘carrot’ for further negotiations. 
Soon after signing the accession treaty, the Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis 
made a statement ‘the border line in Cyprus would separate Turkey from the EU’.136 
3.3.3. The EU 
Before understanding the perspective of the EU on the Annan Plan it would be 
better  know  the objectives of EU on Cyprus. This would explain why it has been 
insisted on reunifying the island.  
First, as it has been obvious  that in the post-cold war era, especially after the gulf 
war   the strategic importance of the Mediterranean has grown up since it is an 
important area for the existing and emerging energy routes.137 And of course in the 
future concept of security includes the economic and social dimensions, the 
Mediterranean is very critical to European security and prosperity. From this point 
of view, not only the  resolution of the Cyprus problem ,but also the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU has been  perceived as an EU objective.  A federal republic of 
Cyprus in the future may play a major role in advancing economic, social and 
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political control of the EU independently  in the Mediterranean and Middle East. A 
divided island on  which  the EU would partly be influential, of course, is not a 
desirable position.  
Secondly an agreed resolution before the accession was very important for the EU in 
order to continue its ‘carrot and stick’ policy on Turkey. Greek Cypriot membership 
of the EU means that a settlement of the Cyprus conflict becomes a condition to 
Turkey’s own accession because it is highly unlikely that Greece and the Republic 
of Cyprus would accept Turkey’s EU membership without a formal settlement on 
the island. Greek Cypriot officials have already declared that in the case of Cyprus’ 
EU membership as a divided island, the government of Cyprus would veto Turkey’s 
EU membership negotiations until an acceptable settlement were found. It is clear 
that such a behavior would create some problems with Turkey.   
 On the other hand, despite the fact that the EU has been  continuously stating that 
the Turkey’s membership process would take a long time and give no guarantees for 
its membership, the EU does not want to deteriorate its relations with Turkey.138 It is 
important for them because as long as the democratization process continues the EU 
will be able to prolong its influence on Turkey and so on Mediterranean. For this 
reason the Europeans want to  maintain close relations with Turkey. The fear is that 
the severed relations between Turkey and the EU resulted from the Cyprus conflict 
would strengthen nationalist movement in Turkey and the increased alienation of 
Turkey and north Cyprus from the EU may result  in    the permanent instability in 
the region especially from the EU side.139  
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As it was said before, the mentioned issues have forced the EU be more insisted on 
the approval Annan Plan before the accession of Cyprus to the EU.  However, 
during the negotiations the only issue that the EU had to handle was the derogations. 
On this issue, different and unspecific explanations was made on the EU side. For 
instance The EU President Romano Prodi noted that the Commission wanted to 
avoid permanent derogations would rise the prospect of a complex and lengthy EU 
ratification process. He not only underlined the Community’s support for the United 
Nations mediating efforts but also stressed that any departures from the EU laws 
should not go too far. 140 Moreover the EU commissioner for enlargements Guenter 
Verheugen told the Turkish Cypriots side that the EU would accept the derogations 
but wanted those derogations to be limited and they would also accept TRNC’s 
derogations about preservation of their identity.141 On the contrary to this 
explanation, he stated that it would be common target of the institutional bodies not 
to allow permanent derogations from the EU acquis and they achieved this target in 
the Annan Plan. 142 
From all these explanations, it is clear that the EU has left this derogation problem 
after the reunification of the island. The EU’s consideration seems  that the receipt 
of EU-related benefits to be presented to both sides after the EU membership of a 
Unified Cyprus would make this argument meaningless. At that point it is obvious 
that the EU actors paid insufficient attention to the reasons behind the Greek Cypriot 
dedication to join the EU.  
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CHAPTER 4: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND THE SCENARIOS  
4.1. Rejection of the Plan by Both Parties  
As mentioned before, the plan was presented a comprehensive proposal for Cyprus 
settlement on November 11, 2002. Indeed the timing of Annan Plan with its 12 
December deadline for final answer,  was not only the indication of  the high UN 
and EU motivation to solve the Cyprus Problem but also an  obstacle for its 
approval, given the fact that President Denktaş was in the hospital for a heart 
operation and there was no government in Turkey following the  November general 
election. Thus it was clear that presenting such a detailed and problematic plan for 
consideration in such a limited period of time is hardly constructive. 143 
On Greek Side, the timing  was also  critical since there was a pressure on the Greek 
side for a settlement before the signing accession treaty of Cyprus in Copenhagen 
summit of 12 December. However, the general election was approaching in Greek 
Cypriot side, and it was not expected that the Greek Cypriot side would be eager to 
sign an agreement bounding the future government.  
Despite the fact that both sides were under pressure to sign the agreement, the 
position  Turkish Cypriots’ position  was not as good as the Greek One. The 
agreement was presented to be agreed before the Copenhagen summit, the details of 
how it would be implemented  would be discussed  after the summit. Moreover the 
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proposal was including the maps on the territorial arrangements. But in the summit 
the Greek Cypriot’s membership was approved , and so Denktash thought that the 
enhanced position of the Greek side by guaranteeing the EU membership would 
lessen his power on negotiation table 144 Greek side had the same thoughts either. 
The Greek Cypirot national council including the all parties and the Archbishop of 
Cyprus, stated that its priority was now is EU accession with a settlement later. 
Furthermore Greek Government gave its opinion that the deadline was not possible 
and should be left until after December 12.  
In Copenhagen summit, the membership of southern Cyprus was approved with no 
conditions attached in terms of resolving the dispute with the TRNC. It is also 
scheduled to sign the accession Treaty on 16 April 2003, and to become an EU 
member on may 1, 2004. Moreover, in the decision, Turkey was offered  a 
conditional date of December 2004 and it was mentioned that the progress regarding 
to the implementation of the reforms would be bounding for the review of this 
decision.145 Naturally the Copenhagen decision resulted in loss of confidence on 
Turkish side to the EU and consequently increased the support of Turkey to the 
President Denktaş since it has created asymmetric incentives and reduced the 
feasibility of a solution based on the Annan Plan. However the TRNC decided to 
continue   the negotiations on the Plan. On the other hand the UN Secretary General  
extended the deadline for a conclusion until February 28, 2003 with simultaneous 
referenda to be held by both sides on March 30.  
During the time period between the Copenhagen summit and the presidential 
election in the South on 15 February 2003, the calculations on Annan Plan was 
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made in both sides, In the North, several pro-EU, pro-Plan demonstrations were 
held. Furthermore  Turkish prime  minister  Tayyip Erdoğan noticed  the wishes of 
the pro-EU favored people, and stated that he was not in favor of the continuation of 
the policy  that has been maintained over the past 40 years. However, the National 
Security Council and the most of the Turkish Parliamentarians including the leading 
member of the governmental party, Bülent Arınç showed their support to Denktas 
on his demands on the provisions of the Annan Plan that would be able to be risky 
for the Turkish Cypriots.146 Meanwhile, in several number opinion polls,  showed 
the Greek Cypriots showed their dislike   of the Plan. Most of them did not believe 
that the Turkish Cypriots should be as politically equal as the plan proposed. The 
South was waiting for the results of the presidential election, for this reason no 
progress was made in the negotiations that already had been occurring between the 
Denktaş and the Clerides.  
In March 2003,  at the Hague summit, Annan met with the leaders of Both sides to 
get their responses to his request that they allow referenda on March 30 on the 
Annan Plan. Turkish Cypirot side said that they could not put the plan to a 
referendum since there were fundamental objections on basic points from their 
sides. Especially in the plan there was a great deal of incomplete draft legislation 
and it would be risky to agree the referendum. The Greek Cypriot side also had 
several objections regarding to  the security provisions and constitutional issues  and 
their leader Papadopoulos implied the need for more time for a campaign on the 
referendum. However, in the end, he agreed to withdraw his objections if the 
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Turkish side would do the same. Naturally since its required changes were much 
more fundamental the Turkish Cypirot side could not agree on referendum. . 
 As a matter of fact, the Turkish side’s rejection of the request  of the Secretary 
general hid the assess of Greek side that in what extent it committed to the plan. 
However the willingness of Papadopoulos to accept the Annan Plan would be clear 
with the later developments. But at that time it was clear that,  with the common 
state in their hands, and under the constant influence of the unifying policies of the 
EU,  the Greek Cypriots could turn matters to their own advantage if Denktaş agreed 
on the plan.  
In refusing to hold the referendum The Turkish Cypirot government was accused of 
being responsible for the failure of the talks and the Security Council made a 
resolution stating that it was not possible to reach agreement at the Hague summit 
on submission of the plan to referenda ‘ due to the negative approach of the Turkish 
side’. The Security council also announced its support for the latest version of the 
UN plan.147   
After the Hague meeting TRNC President Denktaş made some initiatives. It was 
clear from the Hague summit that the Papadopoulos Government had some 
objections on the security provisions on the plan. Thus the proposed initiatives was 
aiming to repair the deep crises of confidence between the two sides by targeting the 
socio-psychological dimension on the island.   
In the proposed package, Denktaş offered to give Maraş to Greek Cypriot side in 
return to lifting of embargoes imposed on Turkish side on the island. Turkish side 
also stated that, if it was agreed, it would lift also the measures of July 2000 
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regarding the movement of UNFICYP. According to the package, a bilateral 
Reconciliation Committee would be established in order to develop mutual respect, 
tolerance and understanding between two parties.148  The Greek Cypriot side, 
considering that  that the proposals were an attempt  to obtain recognition for the 
Turkish side, give an negative response to the proposals. 
On 16 April 2003, The Greek Cypriot side signed the convention on accession to the 
European Union during the EU Athens Summit. Not surprisingly, after signing 
agreement the Greek Prime minister Costas Simitis visited the Greek Cypriot side 
and in his speech said that they achieved enosis at the end. 149 Thus the climate for 
reconciliation created the by the North was not able to be improved.  
4.2. After 23 April  
4.2.1. Opening Gates 
In spite of the fact that the Papadopoulos government in the South rejected the 
President Denktash’s proposals for rebuilding the confidence between the both 
sides, the North continue to try to establish the necessary socio-physiologic ground 
for the implementation of an future agreement. Following this objective, the Turkish 
Cypriot side opened its gates to visits by Greek Cypriots on 23 April. Indeed, those 
measures were adopted by Denktas as a response to the EU treaty signed on April 
16. The Turkish officials believed that the measures were also a step towards the de 
facto recognition of the TRNC. 150 
The Greek Cypriot side’s initial response was in the way of not preventing the 
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passages. However the National Council stated that it did not recognize  the decision 
on free passages by describing it as illegal and intended to mislead the international 
community  Despite the Greek Cypriot’s negative altitude on the issue, the number 
of Greek Cypriots willing to pass the other side were much more than those wishing 
to visit the South. The number of Greek Cypriots who proceeded to TRNC reached  
thousands in the first three weeks.  
After the following additional decision of the TRNC which allowed Greek Cypriots   
accommodate in the hotels of the North for three days, the Greek officials  were 
uncomfortable with the intensive passages of Greeks to the Turkish side and 
presented a draft law envisaging two years  of imprisonment and fine to Greek 
Cypriots who stayed at hotels in Turkish side. Furthermore the Greek Cyprus 
Orthodoxy Church made several statements and tried to dissuade the public from 
these entries. Meanwhile, as an response to the Turkish side initiatives, the Greek 
Cypriot government announced a good intension package; however it did not 
produce an outcome as much as the opening of the gates. The national Council of 
Greek Cypriots decided to gather the Turkish Cypriots under its structure and give 
the opportunity to have the right to participate to the European Parliament elections 
in condition they summit the document showing that they were the citizens of the 
Cyprus republic.     
After the opening of the gates, new initiatives continued to be proposed by the 
Turkish side. On July 2003, in accordance with the Confidence Building Measures 
of 1993,  President Denktaş suggested the opening of the Nicosia International 
Airport for the two sides on the island under the UN supervision in return the 
opening of a part of the closed sector of the Maraş/Varosha. If the proposal were to 
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be accepted Turkey would open its seaports and airports the Greek Cypriots. Like 
the previous ones the efforts of the Turkish side were not welcomed by the Greek 
Cypriots. The Papadopoulos government frequently stated that it would be willing to 
resume talks on the basis of the Annan Plan for a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cyprus Problem. Denktaş’ efforts also were described by the opposition parties, 
especially by Mehmet Ali Talat who is the leader of the CTP party, as an effort to 
gain time before the membership of the Cyprus on 1 May 2004. Indeed the proposal 
of Denktash was aiming the calm dawn the tension between both sides since it was 
clear and, then would be proved,  that the implementation of an agreement would  
completely depends on the goodwill of the people of the both sides. Furthermore, as 
mentioned before, a fair agreement between parties  could be concluded if the both 
sides were in an equal position. The embargoes on TRNC and the Greek Cypriots’ 
membership in the EU were ruining the status of the Turkish side, and the Greek 
Cypriots were refusing any proposal coming from the Turkish side or agreement in 
order to gain much more.  
Seeing that the Greek Cypriot government was not willing to reconcile on any issue, 
the Turkey and the TRNC signed a framework agreement for a custom union on 8 
August 2003 in order to strengthen economic the position of the Turkish Cypriot 
People.  
Actually, the decision should be considered as a result   of the measures taken after 
23 April.  Before the custom union agreement, high rates of custom taxes were 
applied to the goods of Turkish origin. Even after the taxes, the Greeks who traveled 
to the North after 23 April implementations still found the tax-applied goods 
cheaper. But the demands of the Greeks have increased the prices and the TRNC 
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citizens who have Turkish lira base incomes became relatively poorer. Due to this 
implementation, an economic and quality market for the Greek Cypriots was 
formed, and thus the  life in the TRNC and for the Turkish Cypriots would be less 
expensive. 151    
4.2.2. New York Process 
While the initiatives continue, the elections in TRNC became a turning point for the 
parties involved in the Cyprus Problem since it would become a largely referendum 
on the Annan Plan. The  parties divide  into two opposing ideological blocs before 
the election.  Generally,  the National Unity (UBP)  and Democrat Parties (DP) were 
against the UN’s Annan Plan, while the Republican Turkish Party( CTP) and the 
Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH) were in favor. The CTP-BDH were of the 
opinion that the plan should be agreed to with very little change. As a matter of fact, 
these parties remained in the same line with the thought  of accepting the plan in EU 
Copenhagen Summit in December 2003.  
The result of the polling was on the other hand was not expected, the votes divided 
equally between the two blocks. The pro-Annan CTP-BDH got some 48 percent of 
the ballots with  the UBP-DP winning 46 percent. According to the TRNC election 
rules, the seats were equally divided between the two poles. The CTP was the 
largest party with 19 seats. The substantial carrot of EU membership and the steady 
decrease in the standard of living were the main reasons for the gaining strength of 
pro-Plan Turkish Cypriots.  
The increasing votes of CTP and the pro-EU parties in TRNC have strengthened the 
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hand of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s Government which backs the 
Annan Plan. Especially after the European Commission Strategy Report on 
Turkey’s application on 5 November 2003, Turkish government  had reasonable 
conditions for supporting the Annan Plan. In the report it was stated that the absence 
of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey’s EU aspirations. 152 The 
EU and the international actors had the opinion that a fair solution was being 
prevented by the obstinacy of the Turkish Cypriot President, Rauf Denktaş with the 
support of Turkey. In this was, in the international area Turkey was believed to 
create the Cyprus Problem.   
The outcome of the parliamentary election combined with  international pressures  
encourage Ankara to persuade President Denktaş, and the new government led by 
Mehmet Ali Talat, to go along with a new Turkish initiatives. Following  receiving 
agreement from the Turkish Security Council, following he publicly endorsed the 
Annan Plan for the first time since the negotiations fell apart in 2003153, the prime 
minister formally requested UN Secretary General to resume the negotiations 
between the two sides. He went so far as to allow Secretary-General to fill in the 
blanks and complete the details of a settlement if an agreement was not reached.154 
Encouraged from the Erdoğan’s attempt, the Secretary General urged 
representatives of both Cypriot governments, as well as Greece, Turkey and Britain 
to participate in new negotiations in New York in February expecting that the 
agreement would be submitted to a referendum to be held in April 21.  
Following the request of the Secretary General,   the both sides tried to established 
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the basis for the negotiations. AT the three-days talks in New York, the Greek 
Cypirot demand that the Annan Plan should be basis for the talks , not starting point 
of the negotiations. They ask the UN Security Council adopt a resolution 
empowering the secretay-general  as the sole person to fill in the remaining gap in 
the UN plan. And finally they insisted that the EU must given an active role in the 
process along with the Greece and Turkey. Turkish side accepted everything that 
was on the negotiation table, excluding the demand for an active role for the EU in 
the process. Turkish Side thought that if the EU sit at the talks they would become 
party of the talks and such an involvement would contravene the framework of the 
Annan Plan.  
The Turkish Delegation on the other hand suggested calling for Turkey and Greece 
to enter the conversation before giving Annan the power ‘ to fill in the blanks’. This 
was accepted by the Greek side in return to the Annan’s giving assurance of the 
European Union to accommodate a settlement and the offer of  technical  assistance 
by the European Commission.  
Following the consultation on the proposals, with the pressure of the third parties , 
the two sides guaranteed to work on a tight schedule to meet the settlement by May 
1 target. By signing the agreement,  both sides  entered  a tunnel that there was no 
way out. According to the time table, the parties would do their best to work out 
their differences by march 26, and after that Turkey and Greece would iron out as 
many disagreements as possible, and finally the secretary-general would fill in the 
blanks in time for the plan to be submitted to separate referendums in both sides on 
April 21.  
The first phase began Nicosia International Airport Area in the buffer zone under 
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the chairmanship of Alvaro de Soto, the special envoy of UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan.  The stage negotiations occurred at two levels. At the political level 
where the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders sought to agree on changes to the plan,  
the sides were not able to reach an agreement during the talks. The basic reason for 
this was that the Greek Cypriot side acted as if they had completed EU Accession, 
they were in a completely relaxed mood, thus, they had no motivation for a 
settlement. However, at the negotiations by technical representatives of the two 
sides who met under the UN auspices to resolve certain technical issues, the output 
was much more positive.  
At the technical level, the sides agreed on the flag and the anthem for a reunified 
Cyprus. Furthermore, there achieved   progress in the identification of the federal 
buildings , in finalizing a list of federal property and in preparing for the federal 
public service to be in place upon entry into force of a settlement Additionally the 
financial aspect of the implementation of the plan was one of the issues on which 
some improvement achieved.  The sides also worked on the federal laws 
constitutional laws and the cooperation agreements included in the Annan Plan. 
However the implementation the EU acuis was the most important issue held at the 
technical level.  
Regarding to this issue, at the beginning of the talks the EU commissioner 
Verheugen had presented a written assurance from the EU that the derogations the 
Turkish Cypriot side wanted would be included in the primary law of the European 
Union but cautioned that  the rights of the Greek Cypriots to pursue their rights in 
the domestic courts of at the ECHR could not be restricted. However, Turkish side 
was not convinced by such an explanation and demanded that the EU declare the 
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derogations would be part of the union’s primary law. It also implied at the talks that 
the EU accession process of the island should continue as planned while the 
derogations should be approved by the European Union. The fear was that if the 
derogations wanted to be removed in the future, as was the case in 1963, with a 
pretext of "eradicating problems obstructing workability of the state." , Turkey would 
not intervene as it did before.   
After the talks yielded little progress, and it became clear that the parties would not 
reach agreement, the Secretary-General invited the leaders to move Switzerland for the 
second phase. Denktaş announced that he would not travel to Bürgenstock, a hotel  
where the meeting would be held,  but he gave Mehmet Ali Talat and Serdar Denktaş 
full powers to negotiate on the behalf of the Turkish Cypriot side.  
4.2.3. Changes on the Annan Plan  
At the second phase of the negotiations the sides came together at  Bürgenstock on 24 
March with the presence of Turkey and Greece. Since the process was designed to 
achieve agreement by 29 March, the UN sent the parties a proposed framework for 
their considerations, comments and negotiations. As agreed on 13 February if the 
agreement were  not be possible, the Secreatry-General would finalize the Plan.  
Since the process was designed to achieve agreement by 29 March, and there was not a 
progress in the negotiations,  Annan presented a fully revised text, the fourth Annan 
Plan,  for the consideration by the parties.  The new plan addressed Turkish Cypriot 
concerns regarding freedom of movement and settlement, returned properties and the 
voting for senate, whereas it incorporated Greek Cypriot Concerns  with respect to 
efficiency and applicability of the provisions of the plan.  
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Specifically, according to the new version, the rotation of the President and the Vice-
president was changed form ten months to twenty  months. The first president would 
be form the Greek Cypriot side. the members of the Presidential Council were 
increased from 6 to 9 to improve functionality. Three of the members would not have 
voting rights while the other six would comprise 4 Greek Cypriot nationals and 2 
Turkish Cypriot nationals.155 
The mechanism for the return of the affected properties was also clarified with this 
version of the plan. Furthermore the 10 percent  upper limit regarding the settlement 
rights of the Turkish and Greek nationals were reduced. Along with the new 
regulations, until Turkey’s accession to the EU, the constituent states would able to 
limit the motherland nationals to reside in Cyprus if their number has reached 5 
percent of the number resident Cypriot citizens holding internal constituent state 
citizenship status. 
In the forth version of the plan, an important additional assurance for the Turkish 
Cypriots was put regarding the property issue. The plan provides a domestic remedy 
for the solution of all matters related to affected property. It requires the new Republic 
to request the ECHR to withdraw any proceedings currently before it concerning 
affected property. 156 
There were also some changes on the provisions restricted the Settlement. The number 
of Greek Cypriots to return to the North was reduced from 21 percent  to 18 percent  
After an initial moratorium of 5 years,  5 percent  were to return  between 6th and 9th 
years, 12 percent between the 10th and 14th  years and 18th thereafter. It was added that 
these restrictions were to be lifted after 19 years or Turkey’s accession to the EU, 
                                                 
155 Emerson, Mıchael. “Tuekey in Europe monitor” CEPS ,Issue 3, March 2004 available in 
www.ceps.be 
156 Ibid 
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whichever one is earlier. Furthermore the persons who have not been permanent 
residents for at least three years in the Trukish Constituent state could not purchase 
immovable property in the North for as long as the GDP per capita in the North does 
not reach the level of 85% of the GDP per Capita in the South. This provision aimed 
to relieve Turkish Cypriots’ concerns regarding large scale buy  in the North by the 
Greek Cypriots.  157 
Another change  in favor of Turkish side in the plan  was the voting system. 
Accordingly the senators would be elected not on the basis of constituent state 
citizenship status, but by Greek Cypriots and Greek Cypriot separately. By this way the 
provision would prevent the change the balance  in the Senate in favor of Greek 
Cypriots after the increase of Greek Cypriot settlement in the North. 158 
On security provisions, there were  some changes too.  With the new regulations,  the 
Greek and the Turkish troops would be permitted to stay on the island under the 
conditions that each contingents would not exceed 6,000 troops until 2001, and 3,000 
until 2018 or Turkey’s accession to the EU. 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops were 
allowed to remain thereafter. 
The fourth Annan plan also envisages that the Turkish Cypriot constituent state could 
take appropriate safeguard measures for up to 6 years to combat difficulties posed to its 
economy by the EU’s internal markets. 159 
After the negotiations on the fourth revision on the plan, the parties again could not 
reached a consensus on the matters. Related to the new proposal , Turkish Cypriot side 
was particularly opposed to arrangements on property issue while sharing Turkey’s 
                                                 
157 Ibid 
158 Ibid 
159 Ibid 
 70 
sensitiveness on derogations.. On the other hand Greek Cypriots were keen on 
securing the total withdrawal of Turkish troops. While not  seeing the possibility that 
the parties might yet reach agreement, the text finalized by the Secretary-General on 31 
March. The final plan did not differ much from  version of the plan. In general , there 
were some changes on the property and derogation issues. 
In the final version of the plan, the property return regimes were further clarified for 
those living outside the areas of territorial adjustment. All dispossessed owners would 
have the right to reinstatement one-third of the value and one-third of the area of their 
total property ownership, and to receive full and affective compensation for the 
remaining two-thirds. This change made upon the demands of Greek Cypriots.160 
The most significant change made in the last version of the plan was on the derogation 
issue and it is intended to facilitate an agreement between the Turkish side and the EU. 
In view of that a letter to the President of the European Council was attached to the 
Plan envisaging to ensure the legal certainty and security of the Foundation Agreement 
within EU aquis. 161 But this attempt remained insufficient on the Turkish  side. The EU 
insisted on adopting the plan as an act of adaptation where there was no parliamentary 
ratification by the EU member states. The possibility of non-ratification by EU 
parliaments made the derogation issue unresolved.  
4.2.4.Referendum  
Following the presentation of final version of the Plan, the decision on the future of 
island passed to the sovereign will of its two peoples. On April 24, separate 
simultaneous referenda would be held in both parts of the island.  
                                                 
160 Security Council 4940th meeting, The situation in Cyprus, 2 April 2004 available in www. un.org  
161 Annan Plan related provisions available www.unannanplan.org 
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Indeed, before  referendum, the outcome was more or less clear. Despite the 
permanent derogation issue, the Turkish side stated its satisfaction of its demands on 
the Annan Plan. However, the President Rauf Denktaş declared that he saw nothing in 
the plan that would merit his voting for it. Expressing his concerns over property issues 
and derogations, he said that some issues in the plan were changed in favor of Turkish 
Cypriots thanks to initiatives of the Turkish Delegation, but failure to include the 
derogations in the EU’s primary law was a serious concern.162 Later on he declared that 
he would campaign for a no vote. The government on the other hand show its 
inclination in favor of Annan Plan.  The AKP government, especially the Prime 
Minister Tayip Erdoğan, also supported the plan and  made pressure to the Turkish 
Cypriot leader during the campaign before the referendum.  
In the Greek Cypirot side,  after returning from the Switzerland, the Greek Cypriot 
President Tassos  Papadopoulos gave its position on a live televised announcement, 
during which he called on the people of the South to say a definite “No” in the 
referendum. He said the final Annan Plan would not satisfy the minimum aims set by 
the Greek Cypirot side, but meets the main demands of the TRNC.163 In addition, a 
majority of the media and parties, including AKEL,  also campaigned for the rejection 
of the plan. They went so far that both UN and EU mediators were prevented from 
exposing their views in private and public media. Greek Orthodox bishop threatened 
the voters with damnation if they support the plan.164 Considering that there still exist a 
large number of practicing Orthodox citizens in the South, the affect of this 
explanation shall not be underestimated.   
                                                 
162 “Denktaş can’t see anything in plan on which affirmative vote can be cast” Anadolu Agency , 1 
March 2000. 
163 “The president called on people to say no”. Greco-American Weekly Newspaper, 26 April 2004 
available in www. greekembassy. org   
164 “Human Rights Violation In Cyprus” available in www.cayprusaction.org 
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On April 24, the results of the referendum came as no surprise, but the margin far 
larger than expected.  In the referendum, 65 percent of  Turkish Cypriots voted “yes” 
for the Annan Plan while 35 percent voted against. A total of 76 percent of the Greek 
Cypriots said “no”  for the plan while 24 percent voted “yes”.  
The referendum results were seen as a  fiasco by the international community.165  After 
the Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly voted down the Plan, the prospect for a settlement 
have appeared more distant, and the island’s partition more definite. On the other 
hand, the Greek Cypriots became a member  of the European Union representing the 
whole island on 1 May 2004. From the referendum result it became clear that the 
Greek Cypriots believed that if they had rejected the plan, the international community 
would have come back with a more favourable proposal.166 They have had a lot of 
reasons for that kind of hope since once a member of EU, they could have  used  their 
veto power for the membership of Turkey  using  carrot policy. With these results the 
Cyprus conflict entered a new complex phase and a new door was opened. 
4.3. Future Scenarios 
After the referendum the U.N secretary General Kofi Annan’s Special Envoy to 
Cyprus Alvaro De Soto  said that the secretary General was not thinking of starting a 
new initiative for a solution on the island. He also added that a second referendum 
could be held in the south of the island if they wanted.167 From this explanation it 
becomes clear that the future of island will be depend on the negotiations of the two 
sides, with the involvement of the Turkey, Greece and the EU.  While thinking on the 
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possible scenarios, it would be better to look at the future projects and the capabilities 
of both sides.  
On Greek side,  it was assured that the Greek Cypriots aim is not the partnership. They 
are not very content with the amount of compensation they will be receiving through 
the implementation of the Annan Plan. It seems from the explanations of Greek 
Cypirot President Papadopoulos  that by using the advantage of being an EU member,  
the Greek Cypriot side will continue the political struggle through international law and 
diplomacy with the hope of getting more than the Annan Plan envisaged. After the 
referendum he said that his government would continue to work for improving the 
Annan Plan. On the other hand, it is clear that this will be very difficult for them to get 
the new Annan Plan to be accepted by the Turkish side since even the fifth version of 
the plan was able to be only  concluded by the UN Secretary-General by filling the 
blanks. Furthermore they have lost a lot of international support for which they have 
cultivated over the past three decades. In this respect, if they tried to use the veto 
power on the EU membership talks with Turkey to get more from the current plan, 
then Turkey’s relationship with Greece and the EU would suffer and Pro-EU elements 
in Turkey will be weakened. This position would not only increase the prospects of 
greater regional instability, but also it is probable that any attempts to restart the search 
for a agreement would become more difficult without firm guarantees the EU’s 
intentions toward Turkey.  To keep peace hopes alive, the EU may  find a way to avoid 
the Greek Cypriot veto, indeed.  
 Second choice for the Greek Cypriots is to accept partitions in return to some 
territories and compensation that will given to them. At that point it is clear that they 
will demand much more land than provided in the Annan Plan. But achieving such an 
object will depend on the EU perspective.  Soon after the referendum, despite the fact 
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that the EU announced that it would support the Turkish Cypriots, from the past 
experiences, it may be reluctant to involve the negotiations on these issues. When 
Greece became a member in 1981, it gave a guarantee that relations with Turkey would 
not be affected, however many EU decision until 1999 hit the veto obstacle. In 1998 
the four EU members, Germany, France, Netherlands and Italy, announced that unless 
the problems on the island were solved, Cyprus would not be a EU member. But on 
May 1, the Cyprus became a member state. These examples show that the EU may 
accept the conditions and provide support for the Greek Cypriots’ objective. 
The third scenario for the aim of the Greek Cypriots is that, without presenting any 
plan or agreement, they may force Turkey to withdraw their forces and try to make the 
Turkish settlers return to their homeland. After this phase, they  may extent their 
authority on the TRNC by using the EU advantage. The EU member countries that 
don’t want to give a date to Turkey for EU membership may support this scenario. On 
the other hand, in order to materialize  this purpose, the pro-EU parties should  gain 
more chair in the TRNC parliament. Despite the fact that it needs a long period of 
time, as a long term objective, this scenario can be seen as having a strong possibility. 
On Turkish side, there are also some scenarios and objectives. After the referendum, 
the first objective of Turkish side is to terminate the international policies of isolation 
against the TRNC. With this objective, the Turkish side will seek financial assistance to 
repair the damage done to its economy by the embargoes since 1963. The Referendum 
results have created a new opportunity for that since before the referendum, the 
European Union and the United states stated that the Turkish Cypriots could not be 
left out in the cold even if the Greek Cypriots vote “ no”.   
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As a second scenario, major powers including the United States and Britain may apply 
the “Taiwan model” to Northern Cyprus in the event of that the Greek Cypriot side 
does not change its attitude on the Annan Plan. In other words, while the international 
community will still not formally recognize the TRNC, in actual practice, the foreign 
governments may consent to opening normal relations with Northern Cyprus, 
including the restoration of normal trade and transportation links. On the other hand, 
this model is not close to Turkish Cypriots in political terms since they are searching 
for a lasting solution that will open up the road for Turkish Cypriots.   
Finally, even though  it seems quite  difficult, gaining recognition may be a possibility 
for the Turkish Cypriots. If the promises of the international actors are not fulfilled, 
Turkey and the TRNC may adopt  new policies concerning the status quo over the 
island. Through international diplomatic initiatives, they can provide the TRNC to be 
recognized internationally. The Allies and brother nations may be persuaded into 
recognizing the TRNC in accordance with the changing conditions, and the number of 
countries that officially recognize the TRNC may be increased.  
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CONCLUSION 
From the very beginning of the Cyprus conflict, the answer of the question  “why a 
comprehensive settlement has not been achieved on the island”, mostly lies under 
the definite differences between the both sides’ considerations of how they tend to 
see themselves and their positions, and of what their objectives are. 
For the Greek Cypriots the objective can be identified as being dominant on the 
island by establishing a new sovereign Hellenic  Republic  in which the  other 
communities live only in a minority status. In order to achieve this objective, they 
have pursued different strategies through different period of times. However; the 
common point in all these periods is that they have used successfully the 
international factors as a tool to reach a solution that will let them materialize  their 
goals. 
On Turkish side; on the other hand, the tendencies has shaped on the consideration 
of protecting their rights given by the 1960 Treaties.168 In other words, the objective 
is to regain the balance that was established in the 1960 Treaties and thus to 
continue to live equally together with Greek Cypriots while preserving their Turkish 
identity. The Turkish Side’s strategy during the negotiations has changed also in 
following   periods in accordonce with the Greek Side’s expectations.    
With these perceptions, in the period from the Turkish Peace Operation to the time 
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at which the Greek Cyprus applied for the EU membership, the Greek Side have  
preferred the internationalization of the dispute in order to  reach a solution on the 
island. In the negotiations, despite the fact that the TRNC accepted a federal, bi-
communal, bi-zonal solution  presented by the UN , the Greek side remained 
reluctant to the reach an agreement  and became the only  responsible side for the 
failure of inter-communal talks resumed  under UN auspices. In this period as a 
response to the Greek Cypriots’ internationalizing the dispute, the TRNC was 
established in order to balance the  position at the negotiation table.  
In 1990, the negotiation process entered into a new phase with the application of 
Greek side to the EU for the membership. After this application, the UN  method at 
the negotiation table was also  changed in accordance with the new position in favor 
of the Greek side  and the draft agreements would become the precondition  for the 
beginning of bargaining  the negotiations. At that point the aim of the Greek side 
was first  to  make the 1960 treaties be  invalid and ,   after that using the EU 
advantage, in the implementation period,  to gain dominancy on the island. 
However; the Turkish side, being aware of this strategy, continued  negotiations and 
demanded some assurances that would preserve its status in order to guarantee its 
existence on the island, but  not seeing a sufficient response, was reluctant to sign 
these draft agreements.   
In 1995, following  the beginning of South Cyprus’s accession negotiations with 
EU, the relations between two sides got worse  because of the Greek Cypirot Side’s 
armament policy and as a result Turkey and TRNC  came closer. Moreover On 
negotiation table the position of the TRNC changed. Thereafter the Turkish have 
looked for an confederal solution  in which  the separate sovereignty   granted  for 
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each community.  
Seeing that the mentioned strategies gave no result, in 1999 the EU and Greek Side 
changed their policy on Cyprus, and by using the EU ‘carrot’, began to pressure on 
Turkey. These efforts partly gave result in affecting domestic actors in 2002 and 
encouraged  by the changing policy in Turkey and TRNC, the Annan Plan was 
presented to both sides as an lasting comprehensive settlement to Cyprus issue.  
Indeed, the Annan Plan, with its previsions, remained far behind the 1960 treaties 
and partly 1992 set of ideas and even the fifth version of the plan was an 
uncompleted draft. Because the  derogation issue was left after the reunification of 
the island. The plan rejected by Denktaş in the Hague summit, but again with the 
initiatives of the AKP government, was put on the table in 2004. Despite the fact  
that it was hardly concluded by the UN Secretary-General by filling the blanks, it was 
brought into referendum. The Greek Cypriot People rejected the plan by 3 to 1 and 
Turkish side accepted it 2 to 1.  
At that point there raised a question. ‘ if the Plan was so dreadful for the TRNC why 
the other side rejected it’. The probable  reason  may be  that the Greek Cypriot 
government   have realized that if they try to change status quo after accepting the Plan 
the international actors, especially the EU and US won’t  put up with such an conflict 
in the Mediterranean especially after the war in Iraq.   
The referendum result proved two argument; first, any agreement could not reached 
without the consent of both parties, and second if any solution are to be discussed on 
the island , the recognition of TRNC should be at the first step, because unless the 
international community accepts the equality of Turkish Cypriots people, the Greek 
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Cypirot side will never have any motivation for the reconciliation with the Turkish 
Cypriot People. Thus the future of the island strictly will depend on the international 
actors involving the Cyprus Conflict.  
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